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As a result of the 1973 Mideast var, the current
emphasis en properly portraying combat interactions
and analyzing the appropriate Measures of
Effectiveness has become increasingly important,
especially in regard to fire support operations. This
thesis will examine some of the reasons for the
increased emphasis on fire support problems and how
this particular battlefield activity is currently
modeled by the military analysis community. Following
this, a simplified analytical procedure (taken from
general gueueing theory) for measuring the amount of
randomness actually played by stochastic models, such
as DYNTACS and others, will be presented, along with
the implications this poses for current military
planners and decision makers. In addition to these
basic conclusions, a validation procedure for selected
distributions of particular interest to fire support
modelers is presented, that can be implemented under
current operational procedures at no additional cost
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the field of Operations Research has grown
tremendously since World War II, one of the most important
trends has been to adopt ever more complex techniques of
modeling combat for military analysis purposes.
Unfortunately, as our models become more and more complex,
it is harder to recognize the impact which various
assumptions have on the outcomes of our computer simulations
and other studies. Indeed, we soon begin to feel that we
are loosing sight of the forest because of the presence of
all those trees, whose details we are concentrating on to
the exclusion of other major factors which may also have
vast tactical implications. While this problem has recently
been recognized by the military analysis community, it is
not really new.. As long ago as the 'IQIQ's, the
international war gaming community was rocked by the great
debate between the Rigid and Free Kriegspielers as to which
aspects of war games should have precedence: a strict
interpretation of tried and tested rules, or the free play
of military experience and its associated ease of player
understanding.
However, it is not the purpose of this paper to trace
the historical development of this controversy (interesting
as it is) and its effects on the modern version of the
problem. Rather, the present task is concerned with cutting
through seme of that maze of detail in many military models,
in an attempt to obtain some valid information about the
effects of different major assumptions on the outcomes of
the various stochastic simulations often employed in
cost-effectiveness studies and the implications they hold

for the analysis of weapons systems.
Because of the impact of the 1973 Mideast var on major
military doctrine, particularly the employment of Field
Artillery systems, I have chosen to scale down the magnitude
of the current task to a specific examination of the Direct
Support fire support system and the implications our
assumptions have on the capabilities of what is currently
called the "dedicated" battery. As a result of the
following analysis, closed-form solutions will be obtained
which will allow us to measure the effects of the different
distributional assumptions used in various stochastic models
(such as DYNTACS) when attempting to portray the randomness
of combat due to variations in human and weapon response
times. These equations will then assist us in answering a
current, hotly debated question: which models are better
for analyzing combat, stochastic or deterministic ones?
However, before leaping to our final conclusions, it is
necessary to present some background material which
illustrates the importance of this investigation and which
also sheds some light on the nature of the fire support




Since Napoleons innovation of employing artillery in
direct suppcrt of particular line units, the tactical
concepts of field artillery employment have changed little
over the years although improving technology has enabled
weapons to be fired at longer ranges with greater lethality
and, with the advent of modern communications systems, in an
indirect manner rather than remaining limited to line of
sight operations. However, even though artillery fire
support has been valued highly by combat soldiers,
relatively recent developments in warfare, particularly the
introduction of air power and the tank, have tended to
overshadow the importance of artillery on the battlefield
since these newer weapons and techniques have been more
successful in capturing the imagination of both the general
and military public. This particular fascination came to
the fore most prominently with the German use of the
"blitzkrieg" in World War II and has remained in current use
particularly in the Arab-Israeli conflicts of 1956 and 1967.
These short wars were significant in reinforcing the current
emphasis on armored formations and the use of air power
since the employment of small but disciplined and well-armed
forces against a vastly numerically superior enemy
highlighted the importance of shock and firepower on the
battlefield and served to confirm in the minds of many that
the combination of armor and air support was virtually
unbeatable.
As is natural in international affairs, when one party
to a conflict develops a technique or a particular weapon
which gives it superiority, the opposing party is soon

forced to seek countermeasures to improve its own position
and avoid repeated defeat. The conflict in the Middle East
was no exception- Thus, the Arabs, with Soviet advice and
technical assistance, sought to find alternatives which
would enable them to neutralize or significantly reduce the
Israeli advantages in armor and air power. The degree to
which they achieved their goals is more than amply
illustrated in the battles of the Yom Kippur War of October
1973, which led Major General Chaim Herzog to write:
...the comfortable feeling that Israeli air power
provided an answer to overwhelming Arab
preponderance in artillery soothed any sense of
urgency about building Israel's artillery
strength. For years the Israeli Command deluded
itself into believing that air power was the
answer to the problem of the country's weakness in
artillery - hence the very unrealistic ratio of
forces an artillery during the Yom Kippur War.
[Ref. 11, p. 252-253}
and
To a degree air power will obviously not be as
influential as it has been and will affect the
battlefield less than it did. The proliferation
of light, portable missile launchers in the front
line means that close support will be the
exception to the rule in the future, with the air
force being obliged to concentrate on isolating
the field of battle, maintaining supremacy in the
air and destroying the forces in and near the
field of battle[ Ref! 11, p. 261].
In analyzing the import of these statements for future
conflicts we must keep tiro important facts in mind:
1. This most recent war was fought with almost the
entire arsenal of modern weapons, with the exception of
nuclear ammunition.
2. The current doctrine of both NATO and the




In view of the above, it is apparent that the lessons to be
learned from the October war are of vital interest not only
to those nations in the Middle East who figure to be
possible future combatants but also to the NATO forces which
currently embrace many of the procedures which were employed
by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) during that war. In
particular, the effect of reduced air power influence is of
critical importance to the United States with our current
tactical emphasis on both close air support and helicopter
operations. Since the helicopter is even more vulnerable to
conventional anti-aircraft fire and radar guided missiles
than swift jets, Major General Herzog*s comments regarding
the vulnerability of the air forces and the resultant
implications for the ground combat commander are even more
significant. Thus:
...because the Israeli forces placed so much
emphasis on the plane, the artillery arm was
neglected. Once it is assumed that close support
is not available from the Air Force, increased
reliance on artillery becomes self-evident. . .The
war taught the incisive lesson that ground forces
must be capable of dealing with all problems
without depending in any way on the Air Force.
Translated into the terms of the field of battle,
this reguires a very heavy concentration of
artillery weapons, so that the Air Force can
concentrate on maintaining superiority in the air
and intervene in the field of battle in a
selective manner. [Ref. 11, p. 271]
If we are to draw any worthwhile conclusions from this
most recent modern conflict it behooves us not only to
listen to the words of the participants but to examine the
implications they have for our own procedures. In addition
to examining our own doctrine regarding the employment and
allocation of artillery and air power, we are forced to give
greater attention to the assumptions made about the general
combat uses of these systems. While it is a relatively easy
task to call for increased amounts of artillery units and a
corresponding change in the mission reguirements of the air
force (as has recently been done by the IDF subseguent to
the October 1973 war[Ref. 9, p. 31]), this adjustment, due
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to the nature of the military procurement cycle, would take
a minimum cf several years to implement, assuming tht we
actually undertake such a significant reorganization. In
the meantime, our decisions for development and future
procurement would st4.ll be based upon our current models of
fire support systems and our general perceptions concerning
the nature of future conflict.
During a recent Fire Support Methodology Workshop held
at the Naval Postgraduate School, at which such diverse
organizations as the U.S. Army's Concepts Analysis Agency
and the Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity, the USMC
Tactical Systems Support Activity, as well as other
government and civilian organizations were represented, one
of the majcr concerns that was expressed by the participants
addressed the problem of validating the present series of
complex models:
While, as noted above, absolute results of
fire support studies cannot be made proof against
"reasonable doubt", the models and inputs must be
validated whenever possible. This need for
continual attention to proof and verification is
not unigue to military analytical studies. The
theories and even the laws of physics are also
mathematical models subject to test. However, in
the world of physics, the standards of validation
are far higher. No theory is accepted for
application until it is shown to describe
adequately all relevant, previously known
phenomena and to predict accurately the results of
experiments yet to be performed. In checking
theories, great attention is, of course, paid to
the precision of experimental results and to the
purity and completeness of the data and the model
in which they are used. The risks of error,
without such rigorous testing, reduce the
unvalidated model to the status of so many exotic
symbols on paper.
Military analysts pay lip service to these
same standards of validation, precision of input,
completeness of experiment and model, and to the
testing of the sensitivity of results to
variations in input. Several workshop
participants discussed these requirements on
analyses and most have added that these
requirements are almost never met. Yet, to an
astonishing degree, the discussion then proceeds
as though they wereI[Ref. 13, p. 32-33]
12

After recognizing the basic problems associated with
validating combat models, the workshop members then go on to
call for further improvement within current models as well
as some type of testing to be built into the general
analysis program to investigate the variability of results
due to the basic stochastic nature of the models and their
simulated interactions. In an attempt to address this
specific reccmmendation, and to do more than render mere lip
service to the problem of complexity and validation, I shall
devote the remainder of this paper first, to a brief
description of the Field Artillery support system under
current U.S. doctrine, followed by a comparison of two
models which have a significant impact on the development
and employment of artillery systems. My choice of
particular models was determined both because of their wide
use in the military analysis community and also because they
are quite representative of the range of modelling
alternatives available to military planners and analysts.
Having presented this necessary background material, I shall
then propose a specific and relatively simple technique,
developed from general queueing theory, which is quite
useful in evaluating some of the effects of certain critical
assumptions within the current models, such as measuring the
amount of variability which is sacrificed by virtue of the
choice of distributional assumptions used in modelling the
random aspects of some general combat processes. While I
have restricted my analysis to Field Artillery systems, due
to reasons of personal preference as well as to the
increased attention such systems are generating as a result
of the recent Mideast war, the overall technique which is
presented can be applied to a number of other combat
interactions with only slight modification, thus extending
the applicability of most of the conclusions of this paper
to areas other than that of fire support.
13

Ill, THE FIRE SUPPORT SYSTEM
A. MISSION
The basic mission of a field artillery weapons system is
defined by the U.S. Army as the requirement:
to provide continuous and timely fire support to
the force commander by destroying or neutralizing,
in priority, those targets that jeopardize the
accomplishment of his mission. [ Ref. 36, p. 3]
In order to achieve this overall objective on the
battlefield four standard tactical missions have been
identified upon which to base combat
activities[Ref 33, p. 1-29]:
1 • General Su pport iGS]_
An artillery unit assigned a general support mission
answers reguests for supporting fires from the force
artillery headquarters and its own observers. It also has
its fires planned by the force artillery headquarters and is
positioned by that element.
2. General Support-Rein forcing (GSR)
This mission is essentially the same as the
preceeding with the additional requirement on the unit to
answer calls from the reinforced element and to establish
14

communications and liaison with the supported unit. In
addition, the reinforced unit may also request that
observers be furnished and that, upon approval of the force
artillery headquarters, the reinforcing unit be repositioned
to facilitate its supporting fires.
3 . Reinforcing
A unit with this mission remains entirely under the
control of the headquarters assigning the mission but has
all of its fires planned by the reinforced unit. All other
activities are the same as a GSR mission.
*• Direct Support 1DS]_
A unit holding a direct support mission is required
to provide close and continuous artillery support to a
designated maneuver element and must coordinate its fires
with those of the element which it is supporting. It
answers calls in priority from the supported unit, its own
observers, and the force artillery headquarters. Liaison
and communications are established with the supported unit
down to battalion level. While remaining under the command
of the headquarters assigning the mission (rather than the
supported unit) , the direct support artillery unit must be
prepared to nove to other positions as necessary to fulfill
its DS mission. The unit also develops its own fire plans.
Typically a battalion of field artillery is assigned a
direct support mission for a brigade sized force although a
single battery or other sized organization can be so
employed if the circumstances warrant.
It should be noted in the descriptions of the field
artillery missions that the primary distinguishing
15

characteristic between them is not the manner in which the
firing units respond, but rather, the headquarters to which
they remain subordinate and the degree of flexibility they
have in planning their own fires. Thus, we may infer that
the general firing procedures are similar (if not the same)
for each type of mission task. Thus I shall examine the
direct support mission in close detail and indicate major
differences between that and the other missions as
necessary. The primary motivating factor for choosing the
direct support mission rather than one of the others is that
in the standard U.S. division there are four battalions of
field artillery of which one is typically assigned as
general support for the division as a whole and the
remaining three are usually assigned a direct support
mission, cne to each maneuver brigade. Consequently, the
majority of D.S. artillery is employed in the direct support
role and any significant combat interactions within this
system will have a greater effect on battlefield
capabilities and tactical procedures.
B. THE DIBECT SUPPORT SYSTEM
The direct support system is characterized by three
major subsets of tasks which must be accomplished in order
for the mission to be successfully prosecuted: targets
requiring artillery fire must be acquired by the elements of
the system, firing data must be computed, and finally, the
projectiles must be fired. If any of these three links is
defective, the entire system will fail. If no targets are
found, obviously there is nothing to shoot at and thus the
other elements of the system are not even required to
function; if the firing data is not computed, or computed
incorrectly, the required effects against the target are not
achieved; finally, if the projectiles are not fired there is
16

no effect on the battlefield even though all the other
elements of the system may have functioned perfectly. In
addition, since artillery weapons are usually employed in an
indirect fire role (i.e. no line of sight exists between
target and artillery weapon) successful communication
between each of the three major components is a necessity.
For the sake of reference I will classify all functions of
target acquisition as belonging to the Forward Observer (FO)
element; all computational duties as the province of the
Fire Direction Center (FDC) element; and the firing tasks as
belonging to the Firing Battery (FB) element.
1 • Functions of the Forward Observer JJ[Q)_ Element
r
The primary duty of the Forward Observer element is
to provide target information to the direct support system
and to engage confirmed and suspected enemy locations in
support of the overall tactical plan. As the artillery
representative at the company level, the forward observer
functions as a coordinator of supporting fires and is an
advisor to the maneuver company commander. During movement,
the FO element travels with the supported unit and takes
under fire targets of opportunity as well as determining
when to request the firing of preplanned targets. In
relatively static situations, the FO element assists in
planning defensive fires as well as advising the maneuver
company commander on the proper employment of indirect fire
weapons. *
In a typical conventional war scenario there are
usually three forward observer teams assigned per firing
battery, making a total of nine elements in a direct support
battalion. To assist the maneuver units in overall
coordination of the fires that will be requested and planned
by the various FO elements, there is a liaison officer (LNO)
17

assigned to work with each supported maneuver battalion.
The primary duties of the LNO include not only the
coordination of fire requests from the FO elements, but also
the elimination of target duplication, as can occur when two
separate FO teams have the same enemy position in view and
desire to take it under fire. The LNO then acts as a type
of filtering agent to insure that only the necessary
missions are fired, usually by specifying only one of the
observers to adjust fires on the target. In addition, the
LNO assists the battalion staff in planning preparation
fires and other types of preplanned concentrations to be
called for during various phases of the combat operation.
In this respect, the LNO is an integral part of the Forward
Observer element in that he also serves as an originator of
targets to be fired by the direct support system.
In the other mission categories many of the duties
of the Forward Observer element (such as determining the
location of targets to be fired) are performed as a staff
function rather than by personnel in the field with the
maneuver units. For example, GS and GSfi units depend to a
much greater degree on target input from various sensor
systems (seismic, magnetic, etc.) as well as aerial
photography and intelligence data. However, in that the
entire purpose of these other support operations is to
produce targets to be fired, we can say that the primary
difference between these units and those with a direct
support mission is characterized by the source of target
data rather than any other factor. Thus, while not
technically a "forward observer" in the line unit sense, the
higher staffs perform similar target acquisition duties
which lead to the activation of the fire support network.
2- Function s of the Fire Directio n Center (FDC) E lement
18

In a direct support unit the Fire Direction Center
element is comprised of two . stages, the battalion and
battery Fire Direction Centers. The battalion FDC serves as
the battalion coordinating center to insure that supporting
fires are initiated promptly regardless of the tactical
situation and it is here that the allocation of missions to
specific firing batteries are determined based on such
factors as whether the battery is already engaged in a
different mission, the amount of ammunition of the reguired
type available in the several batteries, etc. Although it
is standard practice for a particular battery to support the
same maneuver battalion or task force on a regular basis,
this is not always possible since the battery may be moving
to a new position or may already be engaged in a higher
priority mission. Thus, the battalion FDC serves as the
allocation center by which the next available firing battery
is chosen to fire the requested mission. Also, in the case
of several missions arriving in a close time frame, the
battalion operations officer (S-3) or Fire Direction, Officer
(FDO) usually decides on the priority to be given to the
arriving missions in the event that there are more requests
for fire than there are batteries available, even to the
point of aborting an on-going mission if such need should
arise. In addition, the battalion FDC also attempts to
provide a data check on the computations of the initial
rounds of a mission in order to preclude any possibility of
error.
The individual battery FDCs, after an initial
verification of the firing data, usually control the entire
mission and maintain direct communication with the FO
element until notified that the mission has been completed
either because the required effects have been achieved or
the target has moved out of the sector of fire. In a
mission against a target of opportunity it is often
necessary for the FDC to receive adjustment information from
19

the FO in order to achieve and maintain a high volume of
effective fire on the target which may be moving away or
taking evasive measures. In the case of unobserved fires,
the battery usually fires the requested number of rounds and
then asks for further instructions, while in the case of
preplanned fires, such as defensive targets and final
protective fires, the necessary firing data is kept readily
available on call and regularly updated for changes in
weather, powder temperature, etc.
The firing computations in the FDC at both battalion
and battery level are performed on the FADAC (the M18
Gun-Directional Computer) and are supported by a manual
back-up system. Thus, it is possible for a battery to be
engaged in several missions simultaneously since the
computer can handle two different missions and the manual
back-up can also be used on a separate mission if necessary.
However, due to the limited radio nets available, this poses
a severe communications problem unless there is an
augmentation of available radios and assigned frequencies
for the artillery system or unless one or more of the
requestors has a land-line telephone link with the firing
unit. In either case, while more than one mission may be in
progress at a particular firing battery at the same instant,
the number of weapons per target is reduced to only a
fraction of the battery per mission. Thus, in order to
achieve a given level of target effects with a reduced
battery, more separate volleys must be fired and
consequently, a greater mission time is accumulated by the
reduced battery.
3- Functions of the Firing Battery _(FB]_ Element
Once the target has been acquired and the
appropriate firing data computed, the firing battery element
20

enters the operations picture. At this level the weapons
are maintained, the ammunition fuzed and readied for firing,
and, when in receipt of a mission, the required data is set
on the weapons and the projectiles are fired. The firing
battery communicates only with the FDC and thus is primarily
a reactive agent rather than a causitive one in the
operation of the fire support system. However, errors at
this level are still quite serious since they may cause the
PO element to make erroneous adjustments and thus the
required target effects may not be achieved.
In a typical direct support firing battery there are
usually six howitzers. The size of the weapons depends
primarily on the force being supported and the movement
capabilities required to maintain adequate support. Thus,
an armored or mechanized infantry division will generally be
organized with self-propelled artillery units (usually
155mm) and airborne and air mobile forces will be supported
by the lighter, towed 105mm weapons. In addition to the
mobility criterion is also one of range limitation. Usually
the larger weapons will also have a longer range capability.
Thus, in the case of supporting a mobile ground force, the
longer range 155mm weapons will not be compelled to
interrupt their supporting fires in order to maintain
proximity to the supported units on the battlefield as often
as would the shorter range 105mm weapons. However, this does
not preclude the necessity of remaining mobile for the
purpose of avoiding enemy counterbattery fires, which is an
inherent task for all firing battery elements.
4. The Completed System
Tying together the major pieces of the direct
support system as described above, we thus see that the
chain of events required in a fire mission are linked
21

together as in Fig 1. A mission originates with the FO
element as either a target of opportunity or one of several
types of preplanned missions. Unless there is an emergency,
the liaison officer acts as a filter through which the fire
reguests are transmitted and he eliminates any possible
duplication in both the planning and firing phases of the
operation. Once the final target lists are generated, they
are transmitted to the battalion FDC for allocation to the
appropriate firing batteries and, in conjunction with the
individual battery FDCs, the necessary ballistic information
is computed to insure that the rounds are delivered on the
targets. When fire is finally called for, the battery FDC
sends the appropriate data to the firing battery and the
rounds are fired. Should subsequent adjustments or
additional rounds be required, the FO element responsible
for the mission contacts the battery FDC directly with the
latest change in the mission requirements. Thus, this
description characterizes the Direct Support System and,
with the exceptions or differences as noted in the above
paragraphs, also provides an adequate description of the
other artillery fire support systems as well. With this
information now having been presented, I shall proceed to
examine how this system is treated in current models as used
by the military analysis community.
22

Figure 1 - THE DIRECT SUPPORT SYSTEM
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IV. CURRENT MODELS OF THE ARTILLERY SYSTEM
Prior to examining some of the more widely used combat
models and their treatment of artillery problems, it should
be noted that there are two different philosophies regarding
the purposes of combat models in general. The first holds
that the purpose of a model should be to provide inferential
information to the combat commander. That is, models of
warfare should be used primarily to identify trends in
combat activities and resultant techniques or courses of
action which the combat commander may choose to employ on
the battlefield. In direct opposition to this is the second
theory, which holds that models should be so detailed as to
be predictive in nature. Thus, with the appropriate inputs
and descriptors of the combat process, the model should be
able to foretell the effects of proposed weapons systems or
doctrinal changes with a high degree of accuracy. While the
first school of thought had its origins in the development
of Operations Research during World War II, it has generally
been neglected during the present era with the possible
exception of those individuals who work entirely with the
highly aggregated models of Lanchester origin. Meanwhile,
the second school of thought has come into prominence in the
military analysis community, largely assisted by the
increased emphasis on planning and budgeting that was
introduced into the US Department of Defense by Secretary
Robert S. McNamara, with the concomitant result that almost
all major studies performed in the US today are intended to
be predictive in nature.[Ref. 3] With this in mind, we may
now proceed to examine some of the models currently in wide
use in the military analysis community.
24

Given the wide range of military problems of current
interest, it is immediately apparent that there are a
multiplicity of models to examine which range from very
detailed, high resolution simulations such as DYNTACS and
CABMONETTE, to large scale, highly aggregated theater models
such as the Legal Mix series and the Non-Nuclear Ammunition
Combat Rates model used by the OS Army Concepts Analysis
Agency (CAA) . Thus, in order not to be overwhelmed by the
task of describing each of these models in detail (as well
as the numerous others not specifically mentioned) , I shall
limit this section to an examination of one model from the
high and low resolution ends of the spectrum to illustrate
current treatments of artillery problems. I have
accordingly chosen the DYNTACS model because of its
extremely well-done documentation and the CAA AMMO RATES
study, not only because of my personnal experience with it,
but also because this particular combat model is presently
(April 1976) being implemented as a major predictive study
tool for NATO forces in Europe.
A. THE NON-NUCLEAR AMMUNITION COMBAT RATES (AMMO RATES)
MODEL
The purpose of the AMMO RATES methodology [Ref. 29, 30]
is to provide measures for all combat ammunition, from small
arms and hand grenades all the way up to large caliber
artillery rounds and Field Artillery missiles. Thus, the
overall model is composed of various submodels which examine
in detail specific aspects of the combat process. These
submodels include the Infantry Combat Model, the Tank
Antitank Model, two helicopter models which are used in both
an antiarmor and antipersonnel mode, a Target Acquisition
Model, an Artillery Casualty Assessment Model, the Red and
Blue Artillery Models, and other associated routines for
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assessing the effects of tactical air support and air
defense artillery throughout the theater. Since we are here
concerned primarily with artillery systems, I shall
elaborate further on the Blue Artillery Model and only
discuss the other submodels as may be required to facilitate
understanding the interactions of interest in the Blue
Artillery Model.
The Blue Artillery Model (BAM) is designed to simulate
the allocation of artillery fires on a 100 by 100 kilometer
section of the battlefield for artillery units down to
battery and section level. In order to perform this task,
the location of all friendly artillery units are provided as
inputs to the model along with tables indicating which
available ammunition types are effective against the 16
categories of possible enemy targets that are playable and
the attack and defeat criteria for each target category and
size. In order to provide enemy targets to be fired upon,
the Target Acquisition Model (TAM) is run to determine which
enemy elements within the battle sector have been
discovered. The TAM assesses the size, type, and location
of the enemy units and also assigns acquisition times to
each target thus identified. The final output thus consists
of a list of detected targets which includes the target
identification number, the time of acquisition, coordinate
location, category, environment (woods, open or town)
,
mobility, estimated and true size, type of sensor that
detected the target, and the number of enemy personnel and
tanks which are estimated to be vulnerable to indirect fire
at the time of acquisition.
The BAM takes this target list as an input to its event
store simulation. During the running of the BAM, the
acquired target list is consulted and targets are processed
on a first in, first out basis. As each target comes up for
consideration, the BAM evaluates each battery in the firing
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force to determine which ones can engage within three
minutes (the assumed minimum processing time to fire a
mission) . Having determined which units are thus available
to react, the model determines which of these have the
required types of ammunition available to inflict damage
against that particular category of target in the targets
sensed environment. In the event that more than one type of
munition can achieve the desired effects, the model chooses
that weapon-munitions system which will provide the required
damage at the least cost. If no ammunition available to the
model can achieve the required damage level for defeat, then
the particular weapon-munition combination which achieves
the highest damage level of those available to the model is
allocated to fire on the target. Once allocated to a given
battery or group of firing units, the fire mission time for
that particular target is calculated in order to determine
when the engaged artillery units will next be available for
assignment to another mission. In the process of these
calculations, the model uses the number of rounds that must
be fired per weapon and divides this by the weapons
sustained rate of fire (which is an input to the simulation)
to arrive at the total mission time.
It is readily apparent from the above discussion that
the BAM is primarily a deterministic model with a limited
random input. All of the decision rules for allocating a
mission to specific firing elements are specified, as well
as the rules for determining the time length of the mission.
The major random aspect of the model is the input of the
acquired target list as the output of the TAM. Thus, as
long as the same target list is loaded into the model,
regardless of the random number seeds used for some of the
casualty assessment routines, the allocation of batteries to
fire, and their subsequent required firing times, will be
the same from one run to the next. This allocation will
only differ if the targets on the TAM input are shuffled
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into a different order or are replaced by different targets.
As a result of this technique, the model appears to have one
significant area of danger which deserves some mention.
That is, the BAM does not account for possible requirements
to adjust artillery fire against moving targets on a
round-to-round basis. If a moving target is acquired and
can be fired upon within the time limits specified by the
decision rules of the simulation, no attempt is made to vary
the rate of fire to account for the target's motion, nor is
the ballistic aim point changed. Thus, from an examination
of the model input requirements, there is no special
information required to adjust the weapon effects for a
moving target. Consequently, the model is firing rounds at
one particular aim point when the target may have already
left the area after the first rounds landed. This results
in either an over estimation of the casualties inflicted
(because the target is no longer at its reported location
against which fire is being directed) or an over estimation
of the number of rounds to be fired since, if this mission
were under the control of a forward observer, as soon as the
target departed the firing zone the mission would have been
halted or the following rounds adjusted onto a new location.
This has additional effects on the model because, while
units are busy firing these unnecessary rounds which may be
having nc effect .(unless the target was crippled on the
first volley) , other worthwhile targets may be lost because
of the erroneous weapon allocation. However, it must be
kept in mind that this is a theater level model and thus
must not attempt to simulate all possible combat activities,
as that would be prohibitive in terms of both time and
budget resources. Rather, we are here raising problems
which must be handled at a different level of resolution and




B. DYNAMIC TACTICAL SIMULATOR (DYNTACS)
The DYNTACS model was first operated in March 1967 after
having been developed at Ohio State University under a
government contract. As originally designed, the model was
intended as a small unit level, high resolution simulation.
In contrast to the theater model discussed earlier, DYNTACS
is capable cf representing a battlefield sector of an
approximate size of 5 by 10 kilometers, with some variation
in these limits due to core storage capacilty available on
different computer systems. Because of the emphasis on high
fidelity representation of small unit activities (down to
the size of crew served weapons) , much of the model is
concerned with terrain and mobility problems and the ability
of the small tactical units employed to detect enemy
targets. Unlike the BAM, DYNTACS is a two-sided simulation
in that both friendly and enemy forces react to one
another 1 s moves and fires whereas the BAM is one-sided only.
In addition to the detailed mobility and firing routines in
the model, a great portion of the run time is devoted to the
computation of line of sight and other detection related
problems, including modeling the various communications
networks over which information is passed by the various
combat elements.
The artillery module of this complex program is composed
of three submodels: the Forward Observer, the Fire Direotion
Center, and the Firing Battery models. Each of these
routines are further broken down into events as follows:




Since the forward observer element is
represented as accompanying one of the mobile combat
elements in the model, this routine simulates the basic
measures taken by the FO party if endangered by enemy
forces. For example, if the FO is mounted with a tank unit,
the model assumes that when the tank is engaged in a direct
fire mission which requires the entire crew's attention,
that the FO will not be able to adjust fire indirectly.
Similar types of restrictions are imposed when the FO
element is on foot or mounted in an APC (armored personnel
carrier)
.
b. Selection of the Target
The Forward Observer first checks to determine
whether any preplanned, on-call fires are required by the
combat activity. If the result is negative, the selection
routine then evaluates all detected enemy targets using a
series of weights which are input to the model in an attempt
to assign relative values to the various targets based on
responses to such questions as: what is the enemy element
(tank, APC, or crew-served weapon) ; is the target location
known or only suspected; is the element moving or firing; is
the target already receiving friendly fire; etc. After
considering all known targets, the one with the highest
weighted score is chosen for attack and a fire reguest is
prepared for communication to the Fire Direction Center.
c. Communication with the Fire Direction Center
This event requires that the FO check to
determine if his radio net is open and, if so, the message
is sent to the FDC. Since it is assumed that several fire
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missions may be handled by the FDC simultaneously, up to a
specified maximum which is user input, if the FDC can handle
the incoming mission the FO prepares to observe and adjust
fire. In the event that the FDC is saturated, the FO is
told that the mission cannot be fired and he returns to the
target selection mode.
d. Adjustment Procedures
Once a fire mission is accepted, the FO is
placed in an adjustment mode and, after each volley, must
determine whether to enter fire for effect, continue
adjusting, or terminate the mission. Depending on the
model's criteria for damage levels, the FO selects one of
these alternatives and attempts to communicate his response
to the FDC. This communication procedure is essentially the
same as that described for initiating a fire mission with
the exception that the messages will usually be of shorter
duration.
2. The Fire Direction Center (FDC)
This particular submodel is much simpler than the FO
section due to factors noted previously, namely, the high
degree of emphasis placed on detecting enemy targets and
moving over the battlefield. For the purposes of the
DYNTACS model, the FDC and the firing battery elements are
not required to be mobile since they are usually located and
employed behind the FEBA rather than as an integral part of
the forces on it. Consequently, the FDC is primarily a
transmitting and receiving center where fire missions are
received, data is computed for firing, and the resulting
information is sent to the firing battery over telephone
lines. Thus, once the FO element makes contact through the
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communications network, the fire mission is assumed as
having arrived at the FDC.
When the FDC portion of the model becomes the
current event, after an interval of time representing the
transmission of the fire request, the routine checks to see
if the FDC can handle this new mission. Current doctrine
specifies that two missions can be computed simultaneously
given the current organization and personnel assigned at
battery level. However, the DYNTACS model is capable of
being adjusted so that more missions may be fired, up to a
user specified maximum. In the event that the FDC personnel
are fully utilized when a new mission arrives the model
assumes that the new mission will remain in a standby status
in a queue with the radio operator until one of the
computing elements is freed from its current task. If a
second overload mission should arrive while the first is
still waiting, the model informs the FO element that this
newest mission cannot be processed and the particular FO
sending the mission reverts to the search mode.
The computations of the FDC are represented by
drawing from a random number distribution to determine the
amount of time that elapses until the firing data is
computed and sent to the firing battery. When this action
is completed, the FDC reverts to a standby mode until
another message is received from either the adjusting FO or
until a new fire mission arrives.
3« The Firing Battery Events
This routine performs three functions: it simulates
the duties cf the firing battery personnel in fuzing and
firing the munitions, it determines the firing assignments
of the battery, and it conducts the damage assessment
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functions for the artillery portion of the model.
a. Battery Duties
The duties of the firing battery personnel are
simulated by drawing from a random number distribution to
reflect the length of time that would be required to prepare
the weapons for firing in the adjustment and fire for effect
phases. This is a simple function and is similar to the
drawing in the FDC event to determine the time for
calculations.
b. Firing Assignments
Although this is usually done in the FDC in
actual practice, the DYNIACS model has altered the order in
an attempt to simplify the running of the program. That is,
rather than require the firing batery to communicate with
the FDC a second time merely to indicate that the rounds
have been fired, this activity is handled at the firing
battery level. This change can be justified by observing
that the transmission of this particular message is of
extremely short duration and is thus not significant in view
of the fact that the firing battery has an immediate
communications link with the FDC by phone line and is thus
not subject to a waiting phenomenom as is the FO when he
attempts to enter the radio net to send his messages.
when the firing battery element completes the
last volley of a mission, the model checks to see if any
other missions are waiting to be fired. If there are none,
then the battery sets its next event flag to the time of the
next set of scheduled fires and becomes idle. On the other
hand, if there is a mission pending, the model estimates the
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time required for firing the mission based on the number of
vclleys required and the average firing time per volley. If
this estimated mission duration does not interfere with any
scheduled fires, the firing battery accepts the task and
begins firing.
If the estimated completion time conflicts with
the next set of scheduled fires, the model checks to see if
the requested mission can wait until after the scheduled
fires have been completed. If this is not possible, the
routine then determines if the scheduled fires can be
delayed up to a user specified maximum length of time. If
the conflict is still not resolved by means of any of these
steps, the model then determines the weights of both the
scheduled and the requested mission and the higher weighted
mission is fired. In addition, should the scheduled mission
have the higher priority, the firing battery element checks
to see if at least one volley of non-adjusted, fire for
effect can be placed on the requested target prior to
initiating the scheduled fires.
Once a particular mission has been accepted for
firing, the firing battery element reverts to a standby
status after each volley of an adjustment until it receives
further instructions, upon receipt of those instructions,
the routine again checks for any possible conflicts with
scheduled fires for the remaining volleys as described above
and executes the mission now having the higher priority.
However, once the firing battery element enters the fire for
effect phase, all of the requested volleys are completed
prior to assigning any other missions.
c. Casualty Assessment
During the firing, a damage subroutine is called
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after each volley in order to determine the effects of the
latest rounds fired. This routine computes the ballistic
aim point for each weapon being fired based upon the target
coordinates and the particular artillery formation being
employed by the firing elements. Since the artillery model
assumes that no-fire-lines are placed around friendly
elements with sufficient safety factors as to preclude
producing casualties among our own troops, the casualty
routine only scans the list of enemy forces to determine
which are neutralized or damaged.
C. AN OBSEfiVATION
While this brief description of two particular models
was not meant to be all inclusive, nevertheless, the
techniques cf simulation which are employed in the two
examples chosen are typical of most combat simulation models
and as such are widely used in military analysis. That
certain of the current models have also gained some measure
of partisan support,* especially from their designers and
proponent agencies, as they have become more widely used,
cannot be ignored. However, no one modeling technigue is
appropriate for analyzing all military problems, nor are all
current models fully capable of being adapted to study many
cf the problems for which they were not originally designed.
In many cases, such a modification of calculations or output
would be more expensive, in terms of time and effort, than
in building a simpler, smaller model to address a specific
question. Fcr that reason I propose to examine a different
technique for modeling artillery allocation and employment
than is currently available in most widely run models.
35

V. A QUEOEING AP PROACH
In the last chapter two representative combat models
were examined in some detail in order to provide some
insight into the manner in which Field Artillery problems
are currently handled within the military analysis
community. A simple comparison of those two models reveals
that not only is there a significant difference in scale,
i.e. DYNTACS plays battalion and smaller unit actions versus
the theater level activity of the AMMO RATES model, but that
each plays the random events of combat and human activity
with a differing degree of resolution. Thus, DYNTACS
utilizes numerous random number routines to describe combat
interactions whereas the CAA model is essentially
deterministic once the target arrival times have been
determined. While these differences of modeling approach
are the ones most often subject to discussion as to which is
the most appropriate for the particular problem under
consideration, the primary purpose of the entire family of
military models is nonetheless the same - to predict the
effects of current and proposed weapons and variations of
force size in different combat situations. This is most
easily seen in the case of the AMMO RATES methodology, where
the entire purpose of the study is to provide rates of
ammunition expenditure for various intensities of combat in
both the European and Asian theaters, which then have a
direct influence on the reguests of the U.S. Army for the
production and stockpiling of appropriate quantities of
munitions. The predictive nature of DYNTACS and other
military models, on the other hand, is usually a bit more
obscured because these other models are not typically a part
of a regular series or compact methodology but are, instead,
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employed in Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analyses
(COEAs) depending upon which of them, either singly or in
combination, seem more appropriate to the problem under
consideration. Thus DYNTACS has been used in the XM1 study,
the Hellfire COEA, anrl the Cannon Launched Guided Projectile
(CLGP) COEA (concerning which I shall say more later in this
paper) . However, it is this predictive purpose behind
military models which has had a profound impact on the
development of both the military modeling community and the
models themselves in two important aspects which are
intimately interconnected.
The first of these effects (which are rarely appreciated
in their full significance) is that of the reguirement for
realism. Due to the implicit predictive uses of the models,
it becomes vitally important that the models chosen for a
particular study are not only appropriate in that they are
concerned with the combat activity of the weapons or system
under analysis, but also that they represent real life with
as great a fidelity as is possible within a computer model.
While no worthwhile analysis agency will pretend that this
problem of the realistic portrayal of combat activity has
been totally solved by any one model, or any particular
combination of models, nevertheless, the striving for
realism is cf the utmost importance if billion dollar
contracts are to hinge upon the results of the study.
However, we now find ourselves in a serious predicament for,
when confronted with the body of combat models in existence,
how do we choose the "most realistic" for the purposes of
out study? The answer to this guestion leads us directly to
the second effect referred to above - namely, that of
complexity in the models.
Since there is a dearth of "hard" data regarding combat
interactions, and the dimensions of this vacuum expand
considerably if we restrict ourselves to combat data and
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exclude the results of field experiments conducted under
simulated combat conditions, we find ourselves forced to
look at some other criterian besides the nature of the
inputs in order to determine the degree of realism of a
model. Under these circumstances, the military analysis
community has generally opted for the more complex model
over the simpler one. Thus, if one model has subroutines to
simulate tank-to-tank radio messages and an alternative does
not, the more complex model is generally considered to be
the more realistic, even though no factual information
regarding hew radio messages influence the course of a
battle may be available with which to measure the "realism"
of the communications subroutines themselves, let alone
estimate their effects on the remainder of the model's
interactions.
Thus, in order to justify the models as predictors of
performance, or, at a minimum, as indicators of general
trends which can be associated with varying weapons systems
or force alternatives, the modeling community has been
compelled to build more and more complicated models. It is
at this point that the objection may be raised that not all
models are as complex as DYNTACS and that, in fact, a great
deal of aggregation of combat activities takes place, even
in battalion level simulations, especially in models based
on the Lanchester theory of combat. However, we must not
allow this argument to gain undue influence, for it is often
overlooked that the data supporting the attrition rates and
other factors required by a Lanchester-type model are not
always gathered by field experimentation or as the direct
results of actual combat, but instead are generated by the
higher resolution models and then used as inputs to the more
aggregated simulations. This incestuous relationship has
some great dangers associated with it. While the more
highly aggregated models may be theoretically valid
indicators cf combat trends and general weapon performance,
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the accuracy of their predictions depends directly upon the
accuracy and reliability of the output from the high
resolution models.
Recognizing, then, the critical role which the high
resolution mcdels play in the analysis of military problems,
we must ask the question: how have these simulations been
verified, or at the very least, what work has been done to
evaluate the sensitivity of the models to the assumptions
made regarding not only the ranges of possible inputs but
also with respect to the nature of the random number
distributions used in generating the combat interactions?
It is at this point that the interrelated problems of
realism and complexity exert their influence, for in a model
like DYNTACS not only are there a multitude of factors to be
examined, but to produce a full design matrix which covers
just those alternatives which are feasible as well as
reasonable in military terms, would be quite prohibitive in
terms not only of money and man-power requirements, but
especially in regards to computer time. For example, a
typical run cf the DYNTACS model can take on the order of 60
to 90 minutes to represent a battle which, in actuality,
would be completed in 30 minutes in the tactical
environment. Thus, to get estimates of the model's response
due to varying just one of the many parameters of interest
would require several hours, or even days, of computer time
since no statistician would like to stake his entire
analysis upon a sample size composed of one run. Thus, for
each alternative that we might wish to examine, we would
reguire a minimum of several hours of model time in order to
get reliable data and to do this for all possible
alternatives of interest is most definitely beyond the range
of reasonable expectation.
Having illustrated the difficulties associated with
verifying or analyzing the sensitivity of the high
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resolution models, we are now in a better position to answer
the question raised previously, i.e. what has been done in
this area? Unfortunately, the answer turns out to be:
little, or nothing at all. This shocking reply is
substantiated by the following extracts of information from
the Tank Weapon System Final Report and the CLGP COEA:
Since data were not available to determine
appropriate distributions to describe the various
artillery response time parameters, the artillery
models, as an interim measure, assume that such
variables are described by normal distributions
whose parameters are specified as input. .. Although
there is no data to validate the assumption in
this model, the normal distribution has been found
to describe a large number of physical processes.
The models further assume that the variability of
the response time distributions is sufficiently
small such that the probability of obtaining
negative Monte Carlo samples from the distribution
is negligible, i.e. if "z" is distributed N (M,rl )
i
it is assumed that^u > 40""*, where jlx and tf"~ are the
mean and variance, respectively, of the normal
distribution. [Ref. 2, Chap. 10]
While this citation from the DYNTACS documentation was
certainly nothing to complain about in 1969, when the final
report was published and the model had not yet become widely
used as an analysis tool, it appears that nothing
significant has been done since that time to verify those
assumptions mentioned above. This fact is demonstrated in
the CLGP COEA which used the DYNTACS model for part of the
study and the assumption was made that the variables of the
artillery response time distributions were such that
CT"s 0.2 JUL for the purposes of the
study. [Ref. 31, Vol. 6, Chap. 4] In addition, Fig 2
presents the table of the assumptions made in the CLGP
COEA's analysis of the impact of the CLGP on present
communications procedures within the field
artillery. [ Ref . 31, Fig. tt-25 ] It is significant to note
that the most cited reason for the assumptions is "lack of
standard criteria", even for interactions which are not due
solely to the introduction of the experimental CLGP system,
and also that the validation process seldom mentions field
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ASSUMPTIONS BY MAJOR REASONS FOR VALIDATION
CATEGORY ASSUMPTIONS PROCESS
1. THREAT Lack of Field
a. Symmetrical attack standard Artillery
b. Pcisson arrivals criteria School
c. Speed of attack equal and limited approval
to 3 meters/second scope of
d. No target masking study
e. Targets of opportunity
occur in clusters with
a mean of 3.3 targets
per cluster
f. Targets served on a
first-come first-served
basis
2. FORWARD OBSERVER Lack of Field
a. Can handle 2 missions standard Artillery
simultaneously criteria School
b. Lase only for the reports and
first round School
c. 10-20 seconds to make approval
mission assessment
d. Mission time per target
measured from detection
to end of mission message
(FO does not request
additional fires)
3. COMMUNICATIONS Lack of Field
a. Error free environment standard Artillery
b. Lase message has criteria School
Priority reports and
ounds complete message School
is not critical approval
d. Missions generated only
during normal pauses
e. Message time 2.5 seconds
to start transmission
plus 0.35 seconds per
word
4. BATTALION FDC Lack of Field
a. Net control station standard Artillery
b. Can handle 2 missions criteria School
simultaneously and limited approval
c. Computation time is scope of
2/3 trajectory time study
5. FIRING BATTERY Lack of Field
a. Guns ready 40 seconds standard Artillery
after receiving data criteria School
b. 0.6 seconds to recycle and limited approval,
for a new mission scope of reports and
c. Unloading takes only study test
15 seconds observations
d. Rounds fired not trans-
mitted if round has
impacted prior to message
e. 20 seconds between
successive volleys
f. Trajectory time {seconds)
eguals 4xsange (in
thousands of meters)
FIGURE 2 - CLGP COEA COMMUNICATIONS STUDY ASSUMPTIONS
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experiments or actual test results. Indeed, this is a
perfect example of being unable to see the forest for the
trees and, as the modeling community is currently
developing, more and more time is being spent on examining
the leaves rather than on some of the overall effects due to
forestation in general.
It is precisely at this point, however, that the use of
queueing theory to examine the general results of complex
interactions can make a significant contribution to an
understanding of the effects of different distributional
assumptions in the modeling of field artillery problems and
in determining which areas would most likely provide
fruitfull results after further experimentation and
investigation. The use of a queueing approach is also
eminently satisfactory from the view point of handling the
problem cf complexity for it will allow us to eliminate many
of the extraneous details which lend little direct insight
into the general problem but which greatly complicate the
predictive models and thus tend to obscure significant
interactions and relationships. To illustrate how gueueing
theory may be advantageous for our purposes I shall set
forth the following situation as an example.
A. A USE OF QUEUEING THEORY
Let us suppose that we are tasked to analyze the
operation of a small airport facility in order to determine
whether present handling procedures could be changed in
order to provide better service. In this scenario we will
assume that the airport has two landing strips and provides
ground services for three different airlines which are
capable of handling only one aircraft at a time at their
respective terminals, as well as some general services for
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some locally based aircraft which are privately owned. In
addition, we will assume that the geographical layout of the
airport is such that once any particular aircraft has
completed grcund servicing it must wait at the terminal
until a take-off runway is available, thus blocking any
other planes from service. We will further assume that each
of the airlines uses our facility only as an intermediate
stop and thus does not leave aircraft on the ground for
extended periods unless due to mechanical failures. Since
our primary considerations are to improve overall service,
it is obvious that the major beneficiaries will be the
visiting aircraft since they have time schedules to keep and
thus suffer greater inconvenience if there are significant
delays in the service activity.
As we examine this situation, we initially observe that
there are certain distinct phases to a servicing operation
at the field in guestion. First, the incoming aircraft must
be handled by the control tower and directed to one of the
available runways to land. Following the landing, the
aircraft taxis to the appropriate terminal entrance and
begins its ground service which, in this case we will
assume, consists of a cargo and passenger unloading phase, a
refueling period, and a reboarding phase. After these
actions have been completed, the aircraft contacts the tower
and is assigned a runway for take-off and proceeds on its
journey. At this point all service activity for that
particular craft have been completed.
Since we assumed that only one aircraft can be serviced
at a time at either of the three airline terminals, there
appear to be two places in which waiting lines (gueues) can
form; i.e., in the air while waiting for a landing-strip to
become available, and on the ground while waiting for access
to a terminal facility. Obviously, the degree of congestion
that will be apparent is heavily dependent on the aircraft
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time schedules which determine the general arrival rate of
planes (customers) to our airport, and also on the amount of
time necessary to complete the various ground services. As
our nearby metropolis begins to grow, the airlines servicing
it will ccme under increasing pressure to increase their
flights to this area and thus the need for our study becomes
readily apparent. It is also apparent at this point that we
can make improvements at our airport in various ways. We
could simply enlarge the ground waiting area and increase
the number of runways, thereby reducing the queue in the
air, along with the dangers associated with keeping aircraft
circling overhead; we could enlarge the terminal facilities
to handle more than one aircraft at a time; we could improve
on the service times at the various stages in the ground
process; or, finally, we could initiate some combination of
all of these methods to improve overall service.
Our gueueing formulation is now admirably suited to
determine which of these alternatives will yield the
greatest benefit, for we can model the entire system along
the lines of Fig 3. Here, we see that our arrival stream
(aircraft requiring service) passes through several stages
composed of the control tower (first server) and then onto a
particular terminal facility (second server) depending on
the airline involved. At the second server, the various
stages of ground operations are completed in sequence and
the aircraft is then returned to the tower (which now
functions as a third server) for final clearance and
take-off. With this formulation we have completely
specified a gueueing system and it only remains to gather
some information about the distribution of service times at
the successive stages in order to arrive at a complete
specification of our own particular facility.
Unfortunately, there are only a very few distributions which
we might apply to our service stages which would yield














Figure 3 - THE AIRPORT EXAMPLE
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combinations usually result in a system of state equations
too complicated to solve without using either a digital
computer for solving the differential equations which
result, or in building some sort of simulation. However,
even for the most general type of composite service and
arrival distributions, there exist useful computational
formulae for calculating such factors as the probability
that a delay occurs; the expected total service time per
aircraft; the expected number of customers (aircraft) in the
queue; and the server utilization factor, to name some of
the most common items of interest.
At this point it may be argued that if we have to resort
to a simulation to gain results for our system, what use was
it to formulate the problem so as to require the use of
queueinq theory? In response to such a question, it is
sufficient tc note the immense amount of extraneous detail
which we were not required to use in order to formulate our
problem cr to put into a simulation of our facility. For
example, when examining the ground service stage which
involves the refueling procedure, nowhere did we require
subroutines or equations of sub-stage activity to specify
the manner in which the fuel truck drives out to the plane,
how the nozzle is connected, etc. This is particularly
important in three respects. First, by being able to
amalgamate these actions into one variable involving service
at a given stage, we limit the number of random
distributions that have to be specified and thus reduce the
amount of field testing and verification that would be
required to justify our choices of distributions. Secondly,
by eliminating excessive detail we not only have a clearer
picture of our true problem, but the run time for our
simulation (if one is needed) is significantly reduced.
That is, if we were to use a computer programming language
such as SIMSCBIPT we would find that we could simulate on
the order cf a complete day (24 hours) of activity in only
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one minute of computer time versus something like the
DYNTACS model which takes two or three times longer than
real time to replicate one particular mission. Thus, the
queueing approach allows us to reduce the immense time
reguirement associated with some of the sensitivity analyses
mentioned earlier in this chapter and thus permits us to
investigate the results of varying assumptions much more
freely,. Third, by not specifying current operations in
excruciating detail, we avoid the pitfall of suboptimization
and reduce the probability of overlooking alternate courses
of action for improvement. That is, if we were to
concentrate on all of the small details involved at each
stage of service, even assuming we did all of the necessary
verification of response times and their associated
distributions, the best that we could hope for would be a
model that fully duplicated only the present system. At the
same time, however, the more complicated model would require
substantial revision in the event that a new procedure, such
as in our refueling case, were to be introduced prior to our
implementation of the study. Also, if such a complicated
model were to be accepted by various airport planning
organizations, it might cause them to overlook alternative
ways of conducting operations and, while permiting
improvement on current procedures by such means as reducing
service times, new arrangements of workload or entirely new
procedures might be totally missed due to excessive
dependence en the detailed model and the concomitant
reguirement to change the model if a substantial revision of
general operating procedures were to take place. The
queueing approach, on the other hand, permits the decision
maker to select whatever means he feels will achieve the
greatest level of improvement without worrying that if he
changes details of the particular procedures of a given
service stage that he would be forced to either rebuild his




B. QOEUEING THEORY APPLIED TO THE FIELD ARTILLERY SYSTEM
In the last section we saw how a typical gueueing system
approach could be used to analyze a rather common problem
involving the scheduling and servicing of aircraft. New it
is time to address the question as to whether or not this
technique can be expected to yield worthwhile results if
applied to a combat process, in particular, to an analysis
of the Field Artillery direct support system. In fact, the
answer to this question is a resounding affirmative.
Indeed, the choice of the airport example was made with an
ulterior motive in addition to the obvious intent to provide
an illustration of a typical gueueing application, for its
similarity with the direct support system is quite close
although we shall have to do a little cutting and trimming
in order to fit the example more exactly.
To begin with, we can regard the arrival of targets to
the direct support system as being similar to the arrival of
aircraft to the notice of the personnel in the airport
control tower. Just as the personnel in the tower have no
influence on aircraft which are not picked up on the tower's
radar, or which do not make some communications link with
the tower, likewise undetected targets on the battlefield
are not subject to being fired upon by the artillery system,
at least as long as they are not in close proximity to
identified targets. Additionally, targets which cannot be
fired upon prior to their moving away, or in some other
manner avoiding artillery fire, can be compared with
aircraft that are detected but have to make emergency
landings. In this case, however, the surviving enemy target
is the disaster analagous to the crash of the aircraft
whereas the enemy unit which is taken under fire by some
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other friendly element takes the place occupied by the plane
which manages to make a relatively safe emergency landing.
Preferably, in either case, we would have been able to give
"adequate service" to the customer and thereby avoid
disaster.
To continue the analogy, we observe that each plane can
land on one of two runways in order to reach the terminals
just as there are two main communications links to the
firing batteries: wire and radio. Since we usually have
three batteries per battalion, we likewise notice that in
our example we have three separate terminals for the
aircraft. When the planes reach the terminal for their
three stages of service (unloading, refueling, reloading)
,
it is evident that the length of fcime that each of these
operations takes depends on such factors as the number of
passengers aboard and the type of baggage and cargo being
carried; how much fuel needs to be replaced; etc.
Similarly, each target has certain characteristics which
help to determine the total number of rounds necessary to
inflict a given level of damage; errors in the Forward
Observer^ target location affect the time required to
adjust onto the target and then enter fire for effect; etc.
However, whereas our aircraft merely goes through its three
service stages once per visit to the airport and is then
ready for take-off, our artillery target can be recycled
through the Fire Direction Center, the Firing Battery, and
the Forward Observer segments several times. Finally, we
come to the last stage where the aircraft departs the field
after interacting with the tower in the guise of a third
server. Since we do not require this centralized control
from battalion headquarters in order to end a typical
mission, our target would automatically depart from the
system upon completion of the final rounds and the
observer*s assessment and end of mission message. Thus, we
can modify our description of the airport in Fig 3, as
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presented earlier, if we change control tower to battalion
FDC, terminals to individual batteries, with the stages of
service unloading, refueling, and reloading becoming the
battery FDC, the firing sections (howitzers) , and the
forward observers, respectively (see Fig 4). In addition,
we must also permit a recycling through this service system
until the end of mission message is received, whereupon we
cut off the third server and allow the targets to depart
directly. Having thus illustrated the basics of the
gueueing approach and its advantages over some current
methods, the next chapter will concentrate on the details of
the Field Artillery gueueing model and some of the specific

















DEPARTURES OF COMPLETED TARGETS
Figure 4 - THE ARTILLERY MODEL
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VI. A SPECIFIC MODEL
As we saw in the last chapter, it is a relatively simple
matter to describe the Field Artillery Direct Support system
in general gueueing terms. However, except for an easily
understood description, what do we gain by assuming this
particular view of the process, as it pertains to our
capacity to analyze Field Artillery procedures and problems?
Two benefits are immediately apparent. First, as noted
earlier, it is possible to use general service or response
times for entire stages of the process, i.e. we do not have
to specify, in excruciating detail, every sub-task in any
particular phase. For example, we may realistically combine
the activities of fuzing projectiles, loading them into the
howitzers, and subsequently firing the weapon all into one
distribution to represent the activities of the Firing
Battery. Then, if we should discover through our analysis
that the solution to our original problem is in the firing
battery process, and not in another part of the overall
system, we can either build more detailed models of that
single service element or do further field experimentation
as needed, without changing any other parts of our model.
The second benefit is derived from the fact that
queueing theory is already a well developed academic
discipline and thus we should hope to obtain some readily
usable formulas to assist our analysis, much in the manner
that we freely go to tables of integrals and other
complicated functions when we have need of them in a
particular problem. That is, we may make use of work which
has already been completed and merely adapt it to our own
purposes without the necessity to re-derive all aspects of
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the subject. Thus, combined with the simplified description
of our system, this last benefit may be extremely useful in
permitting us to isolate the critical features of our
process and see their long-range effects by the use of
formulas already available. Indeed, since many specific
results in gueueing theory are highly dependent on the
nature of the random distributions involved, we may also
expect to estimate or measure some of the critical effects
of making various distributional assumptions, the importance
of which was noted in the introduction to this paper.
As we begin to put some flesh onto our skeletal gueueing
model, the first question that must be addressed is one of
general notation. Throughout the remainder of this paper I
shall use the common practice of refering to different
gueueing systems, either our current model or others
mentioned only for comparison purposes, using the A/B/m/K/M
method of notation. For any reader unfamiliar with this
particular labeling technique, reference may be made to
Appendix A, where I have included a brief description of the
method along with a list of common abbreviations often seen
in gueueing literature.
A. A GENERAL FORMULATION: G/G/M
Since the ultimate goal of the present analysis is to
determine the effects of different distr ib-utional
assumptions when used in the model of the direct support
system, our first attempt to parameterize the model should
be as general as possible in order to avoid creating special
cases as long as we can feasibly gain information without
such assumptions. At this point, the most general model
that could be employed is the G/G/m system. Here we are
allowing both the arrival and service distributions to
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remain unspecified, as well as the number of servers. We
are also not placing any limits on the storage capacity of
the system, nor in any way restricting the "customer"
population. As is quite evident, all we have managed to do
so far is to give a formal name, or description, to our
skeleton of a model. Indeed, this most general description
merely restates, in formal gueueing terminology, the nature
of the rather vague model which we have built earlier and
are attempting to analyze. In order, then, to become more
specific, and to make our system amenable to further
analysis, let us first examine the two descriptors which we
have not even attempted to write down, i.e. the storage
capacity and population of the overall system.
1 . The Target Population
While the targets which could be acquired by our
Field Artillery system are by no means infinite, as our
shorthand notation seems to imply, it is also quite clear
that we are not dealing with a closed system either. That
is, while we certainly have some upper bounds on the number
of targets which the enemy could field against us, we have
no assurance that any specific mix would be placed in the
fields of fire of our artillery units at any given time. We
would hope, however, that battlefield intelligence might
provide us with rapid and reasonable estimates of enemy
strength and force mix. Nevertheless, for analysis
purposes, we cannot possibly enumerate and investigate all
feasible enemy mixes, especially when we consider that we
must also allow for non-existent targets. By this last
point, I do not necessarily restrict the definition to
either false alarms or new weapons currently on the drawing
board, although these are distinct possibilities, but, from
the viewpoint of those in the artillery system who are the
servers, i.e. the battalion and battery personnel in
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particular, any fire mission expends their time, energy, and
ammunition. This is the case even if no destruction of
enemy forces takes place as a direct result of their firing.
For example, a common technique used by maneuver units is to
initiate "recon-by-fire" missions. In these instances, a
target is called in and rounds are fired into an area where
the enemy is suspected of being, even though no firm
intelligence may be available to reinforce this belief or
cause our attention to be given to a specific locale. The
rational behind the procedure is that, if the enemy is
present, the incoming fire may cause him to respond and
reveal his presence, either by returning fire in the belief
that he has been fully discovered and is under attack or,
alternatively, by causing him to abandon his position in
favor of a safer location and thereby reveal himself to our
forces. Since there always exists a significant probability
that the enemy is not present, or will not react to this
probing technique, it is quite clear that this is not a
target in the regularly understood sense of the word. Yet,
all of the components of the Field Artillery system are
functioning as if there were a target present and thus, to
the degree that they are employed upon this mission, they
are unavailable for missions of equal or lesser priority
where the enemy might actually be present and more liable to
damage.
In addition to these considerations, let us also
look at the manner in which DYNTACS and the AMMO RATES model
handle this problem. In the former model, targets*- are only
generated upon detection by friendly elements and are
confined exclusively to the enemy forces present on the
localized battlefield. No attempt is made to include
special missions, like recon-by-fire, or even competing
missions designated for firing outside of the immediate area
of conflict. Thus, only those missions generated directly
by contact with opposing forces are played. While these
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missions are usually of high priority, and thus might
preempt other fires, they certainly are not entirely
representative of the full capacity of the Field Artillery
system. On the other hand, the BAM routines of the AMMO
RATES model do not account for ammunition fired in close
support (as does DYNTACS) , but only for more general
missions, such as fires on detected enemy units which are
not involved in close combat. Estimates of artillery
utilization and ammunition expenditures due to missions
called in by maneuver units must be played separately.
Thus, we also see in this case that the full spectrum of
artillery fires are not played by this model either.
One of the major reasons for this apparent disparity
in accounting for total artillery utilization is due to the
differences in scale of resolution of these models as was
described in Chapter IV of this paper. Indeed, we must
recognize the fact that each of these models fulfills a
definite purpose in the general attempts of the modelling
community to gauge weapons effectiveness on the battlefield
and in predicting bounds for our ammunition stockpiles.
However, due to their complexity and particular
concentration on separate aspects of artillery employment,
neither of these models is sufficient in providing insights
regarding the overall workings of the Field Artillery
system. Since we can reasonably expect, and our current
doctrine reinforces this view, that when not engaged in
supporting maneuver units, our artillery weapons will be
employed to bring fire upon other enemy targets which are
being located by the vast array of sophisticated sensors and
other techniques now available, it is clear that we need an
overall model with which we can examine the effects of this
type of utilization without being restricted to any specific
level of the battlefield to the exclusion of other areas.
Thus, we see the importance of not placing any limits on our
target population, thereby leaving our system with the
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capacity to fire upon whatever enemy elements which are
detected and within range of our fires. By permitting our
model to handle all possible categories and numbers of
targets which may become available, we can begin to evaluate
the effects of different decision rules regarding the
assignment of target priorities within the overall context
of the general artillery system.
2- Storage Capacity
It is quite clear that, just as our target
population is not without some upper bound, the ability of
the Field Artillery system to store targets also has
practical limitations due to the number of storage locations
in the FAEAC computers at both battalion and battery level,
as well as the limited amount of paper and other manual
recording devices within our units. Nevertheless, for the
purpose of our general model, we choose not to specify any
exact limit on the system 1 s maximum capacity. There are
several reasons for this approach. First, and perhaps most
importantly, we have no solid combat data which will give us
any firm indication of what this upper bound might actually
be. Secondly, the number of targets that will occupy the
queue in a waiting status will, to a certain extent, depend
on the type of queueing and serving disciplines which we
later impose on our G/G/m system, as well as on the arrival
rate of targets into the overall system. These two factors
alone are sufficient to argue strongly for not placing any
upper limit on storage capacity. However, two other
arguments can also be advanced which must eventually be
considered in our analysis, so we might as well address them
here. That is, if we are attempting to examine the effects
of different priorities being assigned to different targets,
we would want information about the numcer of targets which
are delayed due to their being of lower priority than others
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and also how much of a delay is imposed wpuld also be of
interest to as. However, with a fixed storage capacity
system, we would be forced to eliminate targets from our
model once we have filled the queue spaces. While we could
still manage to process the higher priority targets, by
removing and discarding low priority targets from the full
queue to make room for new, higher ranked targets, we would
still have difficulties confronting our analysis. For
example, if some of the high priority targets are very
mobile, we have the distinct possibility that even by
putting them in the queue ahead of other targets, we may
nonetheless not finish service on an equal category target
in time to fire upon the mobile one before it has moved
away. Thus, by the time we draw this new target from the
queue, we may have tp discard the mission due to the target
being out of range or otherwise no longer available. In
addition, we might have had to discard from the queue a
stationary, but lower ranked, target in order to make room,
and thus we can no longer fire on this one either. However,
we can easily handle this problem by keeping all arriving
targets in an unbounded queue and make our decision on
target availability as we draw the next one for service
after completing a fire mission on earlier arrivals.
This concern with keeping track of individual
targets now brings us to the other additional reason for not
limiting our storage capacity. Namely, if we desire
detailed information as to the number of targets of varying
priorities, and other descriptions, which are forced to wait
for service, we soon will require the use of a computer
simulation to answer our questions since the exact waiting
periods of the different categories of interest will be
highly dependent on which targets have preceeded the latest
arrivals into the queue. In designing such a possible
simulation, if we decide to have a fixed storage capacity
system, it wculd be necessary to have additional subroutines
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to scan the queue whenever a new arrival occurs and the
queue is full in order to determine which target should be
discarded in order to provide room for the new arrival.
This would not only require us to program maximum waiting
times for various types of targets but, in the event that
this maximum time had not yet been exceeded when a new
arrival occcurred , we would need to estimate the remaining
time for the current mission in order to evaluate which
target should be discarded. Since different target types
would have different mission requirements, this would
necessitate several additional routines to estimate the
residual life, or forward recurrence time, of the current
mission. [ Ref. 15, Vol. 1, p. 169-174] Fortunately, we can
avoid all of these extra complications by providing an
unlimited queue and simply determine whether a target has
been delayed too long when we draw it from the queue and
prepare to fire. If our waiting time has exceeded a user
specified limit, we merely eliminate that target and draw
the next in line and perform the same test until we find one
which can be fired. Thus, the advantages of using an
unlimited storage system are quite important to us and
clearly, without any concrete evidence to the contrary, we
should opt for such a discipline until we discover valid
reasons to change our model.
B. HOW MANY SERVERS AND WHAT LEVEL OF RESOLUTION?
Since we have been examining the aspects of our queueing
model in stages from the right side of our shorthand
notation, let us continue to do so and now address the
questions of how many service elements we should include in
our model formulation and at what level of resolution. In
Chapter III reference was made to the fact that the
battalion FDC assigns missions to the individual batteries
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based on such factors as which of them are already engaged,
ammunition availability, etc. With this in mind, we see
that we can choose several possible arrangements to use
within our model. First, we could decide to examine our
system on the basis of one server being the equivalent of
one battalion, and thus each of the operations that take
place on the firing battery level would be sub-stages of
service and our system would appear as in Fig 5. Here, our
arrival stream would consist of those targets which are
directed through the battalion FDC and then on to the
appropriate firing batteries. On the other hand, we could
also examine the distributional effects of interest by
permitting target arrivals to proceed directly to the
batteries, even though we know that a great many also pass
through the battalion echelon in their course of processing.
This latter procedure is already used in both the DYNTACS
and AMMO BATES models and would indeed seem to be our best
choice. By examining the battery directly, we are looking
at the smallest self-contained firing element in the Field
Artillery system, since each battery has its own FDC and
radio nets with which to process missions, as well as the
weapons themselves. Indeed, since the battalion serves
primarily as a coordination and administrative center, we
recognize that if we were to look at the assignment of
targets from the battalion FDC we would find that they are
rather evenly apportioned to the individual batteries in
order to insure an equality of workload. This equalization
of work effort is employed, not just from a desire to
distribute the missions "fairly" from some philosophical
point of view, but also in an attempt to equalize ammunition
resupply requirements and to guard against the possibility
that any individual battery might become too fatigued and/or
depleted in ammmunition to the point that it would be unable
to continue its primary mission of support even if it were
the only one otherwise available. That is, by equalizing

















Figure 5 - A BATTALION LEVEL VIEW
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unless combat reaches such an intensity that all our units
run out of ammunition, there will be at least one battery
available at all times which is fully capable of responding
to new requirements.
In addition to our "equalized" work argument, we must
also recognize that current doctrine provides for fire
missions which may short-circuit the battalion level and go
directly to the firing batteries. Perhaps the most familiar
of these is that group known as Final Protective Fires
(FPFs) . In instances when friendly units are coming under
heavy attack and need a high volume of supporting fire to
avoid being overrun by the enemy, the maneuver unit calls
directly to its assigned supporting artillery unit and
requests its FPF. This request is sent directly to the
firing unit because any delay would be critical and, upon
receipt, the battery initiates this particular mission,
preempting any other fires that may have been scheduled or
in process when the call arrived. If we do not model our
system directly at the battery level, then we must provide
some additional equations or subroutines to permit these
types of interruptions and thus we would unduly complicate
our model when it is possible to avoid these complications
by working at the battery level to begin with.
However, perhaps the most telling argument for battery
level treatment has been provided by the Commandant of the
U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Major General David E.
Ott. In several recent articles[ Ref . 21, 22, 23]
concerning the Field Artillery's attempts to adjust to the
changed nature of modern combat, especially as it is
perceived after the 1973 Mideast war, and the introduction
of Anti-tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) in massive quantitieson
the battlefield, MG Ott has written:
We intend to "dedicate" field artillery units
to maneuver elements moving to contact. By this,
we mean that a battery from the direct support
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artillery battalion can be dedicated on a
one-on-one basis to a leading maneuver
element - perhaps a company team - to answer
immediate calls for suppressive fire. It will be
the maneuver commander's choice as to which of his
elements will receive this dedicated support. He
visualize that a direct support battalion could
provide up to two batteries in this dedicated
role - keeping one free for quick response to
other elements of the committed force.
A dedicated unit will "monitor" the command
frequencies of the supported maneuver company for
the express purpose or following the tactical
situation and answering immediate calls for fire
from a particular maneuver element. This will
allow infantrymen and tankers to call for fire in
emergencies without changing frequencies...
Infantry and armor captains, lieutenants and
platoon sergeants will be taught a simplified
system for calling for and adjusting suppressive
fires since we acknowledge that the artillery
forward observer will not always be in a position
to call for instant artillery fire throughout the
company sector. [Ref. 22, p. 52]
Thus, with a greater number of calls for fire being sent
directly to the battery and short-circuiting traditional FDC
procedures, the argument for considering the battery level
as the primary element of our queueing model becomes
irrefutable.
Now that we have settled on the level of resolution, the
next pertinent question is: how many batteries should we use
in our formulation? As MG Ott has stated, two thirds of our
direct support units will probably be employed in the
"dedicated" role. When we consider that about 75 percent of
all U.S. artillery is used in direct support, we see that
roughly half of all our Field Artillery units will be
"dedicated". This also does not preclude the possibility
that the remaining DS units will also be used in a dedicated
role, merely that we aren't starting out with all of our
forces entirely committed to one particular type of mission.
Because of this new emphasis on dedication, we observe that,
while artillery units will still be emplaced so as to
provide overlapping fields of fire, the primary emphasis
will be on the individual battery and for this reason I have
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chosen to analyze a single server system. Thus, our G/G/m
model has now become a G/G/1 system.
C. DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Having examined three of the standard factors used in
our shorthand notation for queueing systems, we must now
address the question of what distributions will be used
within our model. This brings us directly to the problem of
analyzing our model of the G/G/1 queue. However, we now
find ourselves confronted with a serious problem, since even
such a simple item as the average waiting time for this
system is unknown! Indeed, while certain highly mathematical
methods can be used to obtain various solutions to the G/G/1
system, they are heavily dependent upon the use of Laplace
transforms and "spectral" methods of solving what is known
as Lindley's Integral Equation. [ Ref. 15, p. 273] As if this
series of mathematical difficulties were not enough, it
turns out that we must have precise information about our
specific process in order to un-transform our basic solution
back into the realm where we can interpret our results.
This means that, while certain forms of a general solution
are left in transform format, in order to have any validity
for our study we must know the actual equations of the
arrival and service distributions in order to be able to
perform these reverse transformations. In addition, there
is no guarantee that any particular equation will have a
closed-form solution. Thus, it would appear that, in order
to gain any further headway, we must begin to make
assumptions about the nature of either the arrival or
service distribution (or both) . Unfortunately, it is just
this facet of our problem which we wanted to study in detail
by using previously developed formulas to evaluate varying
distributional assumptions. As was pointed out earlier in
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this chapter, we would refrain from making any really
critical assumptions until forced to do so by the developing
nature of our problem and it would appear that we have now
reached that particular decision point. The basic guestion
now becomes, which do we modify, the arrival or service
distribution? Let us examine the important aspects of the
problem affecting pur choice and see if we can arrive at a
reasonable approach to continue our analysis.
Clearly, whichever distribution we choose to fix by our
assumptions, we desire that further changes or assumptions
should be kept to a minimum. In addition, we do not want to
eliminate our analysis project by virtue of the assumptions
which we will proceed to make at this point, but we must
still find seme way to obtain useful formulas as well.
Therefore, in order to resolve this dilemma, let us leave
our model for a short while and concentrate our attention on
the actual military problem. It is guite evident that, as
targets arrive and are fired upon, we have varying degrees
of control over the process. That is, while we can implement
changes in our decision criteria and in our procedures at
the Forward Observer, PDC, and Firing Battery elements with
relative ease, we have virtually no control over the target
arrival process since the timing of such arrivals, as well
as the varying types of targets, are highly dependent on the
force mix which the enemy decides to deploy against us.
Since we have a very limited span of control on the arrival
process, if indeed we can be considered as having any
control at all, it would be fruitless to examine various
distributional assumptions regarding the arrival process
since there is no way we could modify it if our study
results pointed to that end. Indeed, since the acguisition
of targets is also highly dependent on the types of
detecting devices we use, it would also be fruitless to try
to choose one particular set of arrival distributions based
on current technology as well as enemy force mix.
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Therefore, it appears that the most favorable course of
action would be to make an assumption about the nature of
the arrival process and still leave ourselves free to test
various response distributions and their effects on our
modeling capability. In addition, since the table of CLGP
assumptions presented earlier indicates that many of these
service factors have not been studied in detail, it is
possible that we may be able to isolate those aspects of
artillery response which require closer scrutiny in order to
come to a more satisfactory way of modeling combat. If, on
the other hand, the net results obtained from our
examination of different distributions are sufficiently
similar, we may be able to conclude that further study of
this aspect of combat is not required and thus permit more
effort tc be addressed to other items of concern with a high
degree of assurance that our current modeling techniques are
sufficiently accurate for analysis purposes.
Even with these considerations in mind, we must,
nonetheless, still choose a particular distribution to use
in the arrival process in order to be able to continue our
evaluation. As may be noted in Appendix A, there are
several possibilities which are quite common in practice,
not to mention others which appear less frequently.
Fortunately, however, both queueing and renewal theory have
what amounts to a form of Central Limit Theorem similar to
that frequently called into service by statisticians.
Whereas the latter can make use of the Law of Large Numbers
to postulate that, in the long run at least, many numerical
techniques tend toward a Normal distribution, likewise
Alexandr Khintchine has shown that in many cases the sum of
a large number of independent renewal processes, each with
an arbitrary distribution of renewal time, will tend toward
a Poisson process. [Ref. 14, p. 23-36] While we would like
to change our model from that of a G/G/1 system to a new
M/G/1 version by recognizing that a Poisson arrival process
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is equivalent to having exponentially distributed
interarrival times, [fief. 26, p. 120-121] we must first try
to ascertain whether we can safely adopt the Poisson
assumption or whether the available evidence would indicate
that another distribution would be more appropriate.
If we were engaging in our analysis merely as an
academic exercise, rather than hoping to obtain a useful
method of evaluating distributional assumptions, it would
probably be sufficient to point to other studies that use
some version of a Poisson arrival process to justify our own
usage. In that case, we would merely cite the CLGP
Communications study previously referred to and continue our
examination. In addition, it can be shown, using a simple
proof by analogy[Ref. 5, p. 958-964], that the routines used
in the AMMO RATES model to assign detection times to
acquired targets results in an overall nonhomogeneous
Poisson process, although the actual documentation of that
model does net indicate that this was the original intention
of the designers but came about as a result of the
allocation techniques which they used. Besides these other
models, however, we would like to feel confident that the
combat process itself supports our adoption of the Poisson
assumption. While very little empirical evidence exists to
support any particular choice of distribution, perhaps a
heuristic argument will serve the purpose, especially in
view of the other arguments given above.
Turning once again to the battlefield, we readily
observe that the target acquisition process, which produces
the arrival stream of our model, has different
characteristics depending upon the types of forces engaged
and the variety of additional sensors that may be employed
by both sides. That is, there are certain basic functions
which are performed differently by various observers and
sensors which produce the acquired targets. For example, if
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we look at a friendly infantry platoon in a defensive
posture, Me discover that, in addition to the troops in
their fighting positions, we also have the capability to
employ various types of sensors and detecting radar to
assist in detecting any approaching enemy forces. It is
clear in this example that if we employ a ground radar, we
will have a certain distribution which will describe the
manner in which moving enemy targets, such as tanks and
APCs, will be detected, but other types, such as stationary
bunkers, will only be acquired by visual or other means,
certainly not directly by the radar. Thus, it is apparent
that we have a different acquisition process in operation
for each type of sensing device (including each individual
soldier) employed on the battlefield.
In addition to this multitude of possible detectors, we
also note that we are increasing the number of channels by
means of which target locations can be brought to the
attention of artillery units, especially by using the
dedicated battery technique, which calls for our artillery
units to directly monitor the supported unit's radio net in
order to respond instantly. In addition to this summing of
individual renewal processes for each sensor, we also note
that the probability that any one person (or sensor) detects
more than one target at any particular instant is quite
small, since his attention or capability will focus on his
first detection and act as a filter which limits his field
of vision to a much narrower area. Thus, targets which are
in a dispersed formation will not all be detected by one
individual or device. This further aspect of the detection
process would also seem to support a Poisson assumption
since one of the basic properties of such a process is that
the probability of two events occurring in an extremely
short period of time be quite small. [Ref. 26, p. 118] Thus,
we see that there are other factors operating on the
battlefield which tend to support the Poisson process
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assumption in addition to the limiting argument orignally
developed by Khintchine and with this in mind we shall
accept this modification and change our model to an H/G/1
system
D. THE FINAL MODEL
In this chapter we have developed our model beyond the
point of mere generalty, from a basic G/G/m system to a
final M/G/1 version. While we have been forced to make
several assumptions regarding such factors as the system's
storage capacity and the size of the target population, we
have attempted to justify our approach, not only on the
grounds of modeling simplicity, but also by a close
examination of the actual combat . process which we are
attempting to analyze. In this respect, perhaps our most
critical assumption in the final model is the Poisson
character of the arrival stream. However, even here we have
stressed not only the need for some type of further
simplification to render the model more tractable, but we
have also shown the applicability of a central limting
argument which is firmly supported by the actual combat
interactions that we may expect on present and future
battlefields. At this point, in order to continue our
study, «e must address the questions of what information we
hope to measure in our particular model and how this
translates to significant aspects of the combat process.
Since this is the whole question of what Measures Of
Effectiveness (MOEs) to use, we shall address that problem
in detail in the following chapter.
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VII. MEASURES 0_F EFFECTIVENESS
A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The most critical aspect of any Operations Research
study is concerned with the choice of the correct, or most
appropriate and applicable, set of Measures of Effectiveness
(MOEs) . By our choice of what to measure and interpret, we
influence the final conclusions of any particular study and,
in some cases, determine the outcome long in advance of the
detailed analysis. A classic example of just how critical
the choice of MOEs can be is presented in Morse and Kimbal's
Methods of Operations Research in regard to evaluating the
value of anti-aircraft weapons in protecting Allied shipping
during World War II.[Ref. 19, p. 52-53] While this example
occurred ever thirty years ago, the common pitfalls it
discloses are still of great danger to any analyst
confronted with a practical problem and it behooves us to
take some time, prior to developing complex formulas or
cranking out a massive volume of numbers, to decide just
what we wish to measure with our model and how we can
interpret the results and their impact on battlefield
activities.
It has already been noted earlier that most major models
currently in use by the analysis community are designed to
be predictive in nature, especially due to the reguirement
for cost-effectiveness studies for different weapons
alternatives. Not surprisingly, therefore, we find this
emphasis cropping up in the choice of MOEs which are made by
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the planners and analysts involved in obtaining information
from these models. Thus, the most frequently used measure
is the number of enemy personnel and major pieces of
equipment (usually tanks and APCs) which are destroyed by
the friendly forces by some time period in the battle. This
is not to imply that these are the only numbers which are
printed out by the models, but they are the ones used for
the final justifications of the study's conclusions. Thus,
while both DYNTACS and AMMO BATES, for example, both give an
immense volume of additional statistics, such as vehicle
velocities and locations at various times during the battle
(DYNTACS) or the number of rounds fired (AMMO RATES) , we
still concentrate our attention on the measures of enemy
casualties and usually look at these other numbers only in
the event of tied outcomes.
In essence, then, what we have done in constructing and
using these and other models, is to rely heavily upon the
pure engineering aspects of current and proposed weapons
systems as they fit into our tactical doctrine. That is,
while we don't merely line up a series of targets on a
practice range and see which weapon produces the greatest
amount of damage, we attempt to place this damage into the
context of a military operation. At this point, however, we
are faced with some grave difficulties. For example, if we
desire to test different types of artillery ammunition, each
with a different size lethal area, we can first do our basic
development tests prior to the COEA. At that time we will
get some relatively firm information as to the exact size of
the danger zone and, for the purpose of this example, let us
suppose that the first shell has a lethal area which
includes all unprotected personnel within five meters of the
impact with a guarantee of achieving 100 percent casualties.
Let us also assume that the second round has a radius of
destruction equal to ten meters and similar damage
characteristics within that zone. From this, it is quite
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clear that if we merely line up some closely grouped targets
and fire different rounds at them, the secdnd shell will
cause the greater amount of destruction- However, we
realize that such groupings of personnel might be highly
unlikely in actual combat and so we input the proper
descriptors cf the ammunition performance into a combat
model and attempt to determine which type of ammunition is
more effective in an operational environment. At this
point, however, our basic choice of model and input enemy
force mix alcost completely determines our final conclusions
unless some totally unforeseen interactions take place. For
example, if we use our two proposed types of ammunition
against a heavily arcored force, neither will appear to do
very well since we are discriminating among them on the
basis of their anti- personnel capability. On the other
hand, should we use them against a predominantly infantry
enemy force, the size of the enemy units which are input to
the model and subsequently fired upon will drive the final
conclusions of the study. If the opposing force attacks or
maneuvers in very tightly organized groups we are likely to
see that, if the groups themselves are large, the second
round will have the greater effect while, if the groups are
small, the first round will be more effective. On the other
hand, the model might use the same size groups for different
runs but vary the dispersion pattern within each group in
such a manner as to effect which types of ammunition will be
considered most effective. Since the emphasis is purely on
enemy casualties obtained, it is possible to estimate the
winner of our competition solely by a close examination of
the models inputs and casualty routines.
However, this still does not really solve our problem of
determining true effectiveness, since it is quite possible
that different practices of weapons employment might have
vastly different implications for our capability. Thus, we
might feel that the first ammunition type would be most
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effective in use against units close to the Forward Edge of
the Battle Area (FEBA) since the proximity of other weapons
adds to the tasic military requirement to remain relatively
dispersed in order to avoid excessive casualties. Yet, if
our weapons also have the range capability to reach out
behind the FEEA and strike enemy assembly and staging areas,
the second round will be more effective in those
circumstances because of the greater proximity of personnel
to each other in the more secure areas. In addition, we
must realize that any weapon development simultaneously
starts work en counter measures and this example is no
exception. Thus, our opponent might decide to increase the
basic armor protection of his infantry, or move his staging
areas further to the rear and out of our range, or finally,
he might disperse his forces even more widely in order to
reduce the effectiveness of whichever type of ammunition we
adopt. Unfortunately, our models do not play this
adaptability on the part of our opponents, nor do they give
any firm answer as to which of these alternatives (or
combination thereof) he might adopt.
Finally, especially when we are considering artillery
systems, our current models do not play the occurrence of
false detections and/or erroneous identification. For
example, in DYNTACS, once an enemy target is acquired by a
firing element as a firm detection, there is no doubt about
the true nature of the target. That is, there are no
mistakes in identification: if an APC generated the
detection, there is no possibility that it might be mistaken
for a tank, or vice versa. In addition, only the actual
presence of enemy units can bring about a detection event,
which is not entirely correct as we noted when discussing
the recon-by-fire technique which is often employed when it
is not feasible or desireable to actually send troops into
an area to determine whether the enemy is present. Thus, we
see that in a situation where we are attempting to model
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artillery fires, the problem of false detections and/or
erroneous identification becomes quite important and if our
MOE is based on actual casualties produced, we are failing
to account for all of the rounds that would be fired. That
is, since we only shoot missions that are directed against
actual targets, we have no estimate of the rounds fired
against non-existent but suspected enemy concentrations.
While we would certainly hope that our vast array of sensor
systems and intelligence personnel will provide us with
accurrate data regarding the enemy 1 s true location and
disposition, nevertheless, we must still recognize this
important problem.
There is also another aspect to this matter which we
touched upon in a previous section. That is, as long as we
are firing, even if it be at non-existent targets, we are
expending ammunition and effort and are not allocating our
fires against what might be the best choice of targets
available. Thus, in addition to underestimating the number
of rounds fired, we may also be over valuing the apparent
effectiveness of the rounds we do fire by not considering
these false alarms. However, even without stressing this
aspect of actual combat, we can see that current
developments require us to consider more facets of our
operations that just net enemy casualties. If we go back to
MG Ott's article we find the following passage:
Finally, if necessary, we will give up some
degree of accuracy in the interest of speed for
immediate suppression. When maneuver elements
come under tire, our reaction must be quick and
violent. Two 155-mm rounds impacting 200-300
meters from an enemy ATGM gunner will surely cause
him some concern, whereas a battalion firing three
volleys on target 5 minutes later might well be
too late.[Ref. 22, p. 52]
It is apparent that, as suppression and other non-casualty
producing effects assume a higher level of importance in
tactical operations, our concern soon broadens to include
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factors such as the timeliness of our fires and how many
targets we can shoot at within a reasonable period of delay
for the purposes of data computation, etc. Also in MG Ott*s
article, reference is made to a more extensive use of smoke
munitions which will have an effect on target visibility on
the battlefield and it is quite apparent that the use of
smoke, per se, is not likely to produce voluminous casualty
figures due to the subsequent degradation of detection
capability that will result, not to mention the fact that
unless one hits an infantry soldier with the actual
canister, smoke rounds themselves do not produce casualties.
This is applicable, not only to the suppressed enemy force,
but to our own troops as well since reducing battlefield
visibility affects both sides. Thus, if we continue to
place our emphasis on casualties, we are neglecting other
pertinent military factors which would appear to be gaining
in importance regarding their impact on ordinary operations.
While we are considering the problems associated with
timeliness on the battlefield, we are also led to examine
another aspect of the problem as concerns firing against
moving targets. In the high resolution models (such as
DYNTACS) , this factor is usually of minor concern since the
model keeps track of the location and velocities of all
maneuvering units through-out the course of the simulation
and when fire is called for the model assesses the actual
round impact for artillery weapons as well as the line of
sight trajectory for direct fire weapons. However, in the
lower resolution, more highly aggregated models (such as
AMMO RATES) , this degree of detail is not feasible and thus
decision variables are put into the model which serve to
indicate that if a mobile target cannot be fired upon within
a certain user specified minimum time restriction, then that
target is dropped from further consideration unless it is
detected at a subsequent time. We have already looked at
this problem when we were considering the size storage
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capacity for our queueing model and we have no need to
reiterate all of the arguments advanced in that section.
However, one point should be made here concerning that
problem and how it affects our consideration of MOEs. That
is, upon what factors do we base our choice of minimum delay
times, after which we cannot fire at a moving target? Close
examination of this point reveals that, while some data is
obtained from other, higher resolution models, by and large
the numbers which are input for this decision point are
based on the old standby "military experience and
professional judgment." Now, as a military man myself, I
would be one of the last to scoff at or denigrate this
important factor in tactical and strategic decision making.
However, we must also recognize that military experience,
per se, is no guarantee that we will obtain the correct
conclusions or insights, or even make the proper
estimations. Indeed, this is clear if we look back into
history at past wars and their effects on doctrine and
weaponry. For example, many nations experienced the
slaughter of trench warfare in World War I, yet it was
primarily the Germans who fully developed the counter to
that stagnation which we still call "blitzkrieg." Yet, the
other nations which participated in that war, and also
gained military experience, did not always come to the same
set of conclusions, to wit: the Maginot Line. Thus, if
military experience is not infallible, one of the
considerations for our MOE might be to determine if we can
set some practical limits on these delay times for acguired
targets and measure the effect of different cut-off points
as regards optimal artillery employment.
B. SPECIFIC FACTOBS OF CONCEBN
Having thus demonstrated the importance of factors
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associated with the tin»ing and allocation of fires, we must
now formulate the questions which we shall try to answer by
using our specific queueing model. Then, in the following
section, I shall present the specific measures which our
queueing approach provides and which are applicable to our
analysis. Using this procedure then, we note that we must
address the following questions:
1. What percentage of the time is our battery busy?
2. If the tattery is busy when we randomly check the
system, how long will the current mission last before
being completed?
3. How long is the typical busy period and how much
variability do we observe?
4. How many targets will be served during a typical busy
period?
5. How many targets can we expect to observe in the queue
and the entire system if we take a random glance at the
model?
6. What is the average service time and the average
waiting time for targets?
7. Finally, given that we must wait, how long is the
delay?
Since the posing of these basic questions, as well as
the manner in which we attempt to answer them, will have an
important bearing on our study results, let us examine each
of them for their implications pertaining to actual combat
operations. Thus, our first requirement is to determine the
percentage cf time that our unit is engaged in firing
missions. While this seems to be a very elementary point it
is, nonetheless, quite important for this measure will be
one of the driving forces of our system's behavior. Indeed,
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we would expect, even without examining the specific
formulas which describe the behavior of our system, that if
we are seldom busy then such items of interest as the
average delay, etc. will be relatively small, whereas if our
battery is almost constantly busy, new arrivals will have to
wait for longer periods of time in order to be served.
However, the utilization factor for our system is more
important that serving as a major driving force for other
system parameters of interest. In addition to that aspect
of our problem, the percent of time the unit is found
engaged in a fire mission has implications regarding the
fatigue of our personnel and the amount of work that must
also be accomplished by our supply system in providing
adequate stocks of ammunition. That is, if we usually fire
an average of ten percent of the day, this means that
slightly less than three hours are taken up in firing and we
are thus able to spend a good portion of our time on other
tasks, such as improving the battery position, moving to new
locations, or performing necessary maintenance without
interruption of firing. On the other hand, if our battery
is engaged for 80-90 percent of a typical day, this gives us
very little opportunity for those other tasks mentioned
above and would tell us that if we must stop firing for some
reason that such a course of action might have disasterous
consequences for units needing our fire support. Thus,
while our percent of time busy is a relatively simple value
to compute, it has enormous implications for our tactical
procedures.
Our second question, relating to the remaining length of
service for the particular mission being fired when we take
a glance at the system, is important for a couple of
reasons. First, it provides us with an estimate of how much
more effort is required before we can plan on either
relaxing into an idle status or, in the event that more
targets are still to be served, how soon we can begin firing
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the next mission. This estimate can be quite important,
especially if the next target is of extremely high priority
or is very mobile, since our estimated time remaining for
the current mission will allow us to decide whether it would
be more advantageous to interrupt the old mission to take
the new target under fire immediately or whether we could
safely finish our current task prior to firing the next
target. This information on the residual life of a target
can thus provide us with decision criteria as to which
categories cf targets deserve pre-emptive treatment and
which can afford to wait. For example, by getting estimates
of the residual life, we can then check other models which
use a time limit on firing against mobile targets to
determine if we are losing a significant number of possible
targets due to excessively short waiting times and, if this
is the case, we may either reevaluate the time limits we use
or else allow these mobile targets to get special treatment
by changing the handling procedures associated with this
category target.
Intimately related to the first two questions are
numbers three and four, since they pertain to the amount of
work done in a typical busy period. By looking at the
responses to these two questions we should hope to be able
to tell whether we have many short periods of heavy activity
or several lcnger periods of more moderate activity. This
measure, and that associated with the average number of
targets handled per busy period, will be able to give us
some insight into standard battery activities and how they
are affected by fire missions. For example, we have already
noted the importance of battery utilization as regards such
matters as maintenance, etc. By examining the factors
pertaining to questions three and four, we should be able to
evaluate whether or not we will have the opportunity to
conduct short maintenance operations between missions or
whether we will have to consider pulling different gun
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sections off line in order to permit adequate weapon
maintenance to be performed. Since this decision affects
the number cf rounds that will be fired, and thus, directly
affects the amount of resupply activities we must engage in,
not to mention the obvious fact of enemy casualties, we can
certainly understand the need for some adequate insights
into this part of the combat process.
The remaining three questions pertain to overall system
performance rather than to activities solely related to
firing periods. Thus, the number of targets in the queue at
any one time is a measure of the backlog of work to be done
and therefore we would hope that, if our system is
functioning adequately, this number, and the associated
average waiting and firing times, would be small. Yet, we
must realize that the only way we will ever guarantee that
no queue forms, and thus no delays for service, is to have a
firing element, whether it be battery size or of some other
configuration, always available in order to handle each new
target as it arrives. This would be the equivalent of an
M/G/ system and it is quite clear that our limited national
resources will never allow us to achieve this unlimited
number of firing elements to handle each new arrival. Thus,
the average queue buildup will serve as a measure of how
well our procedures achieve their desired ends of serving
targets within short response times and will also provide
some additional information, besides that obtained from the
utilization factor, regarding how well our battery is
performing its mission. For example, it would be possible
to have a high utilization factor, such as 90 percent,
without suffering adverse effects on our firing procedures.
This could occur in a number of ways. Thus, we could have a
series of arrivals that occur just after we finish a
mission, thereby causing us to start firing again almost
immediately, yet with very little queue buildup because the
next arrival would also occur just as we finish with the
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current target. While we would still be concerned about our
ability to handle maintenance, resupply, and fatigue
problems, this particular situation is certainly to be
preferred over the case when we would have the same
utilization factor but the targets are arriving into the
firing system such that we cannot respond fast enough and
thus the queue increases substantially in addition to the
heavy utilization of weapons and personnel- It is obvious
from this example that the utilization factor alone is not
sufficient to fully describe the activities of interest and
thus we are led to consider such other measures as the
number of targets which are waiting for service and their
associated average delay and overall service times.
However, before proceeding to present the formulas we
will use to measure these items of interest, the last
question in our list requires some further explanation
inasmuch as we are already measuring waiting times as part
of the response to question number six. The fact which we
must recognize here is that the average waiting time for the
system is different than the average waiting time for those
targets which incur a delay in being fired due to other
missions being in progress when they arrive. This is not as
contradictory as it first appears. When we measure the
average waiting time for the entire system we are merely
recording the amount of time a target is delayed until
firing on it begins. Clearly then, when a target arrives
and no firing is in progress the waiting period until
processing begins is zero. This accumulation of zero
waiting times is included when we average the delays for all
targets and serves to reduce the overall average delay.
However, if we have a fairly high utilization factor, those
targets which arrive wnile firing is already under way will
incur larger delays and, if we restrict ourselves to the
total system delay, we thereby underestimate the waiting
times of the delayed targets as compared to all targets.
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This last question (number 7) addresses this problem by
measuring the delays only for those targets which are
actually forced to wait and thus gives us a fairer picture
of the service process when system utilization is high. In
the case where the utilization factor is small, this last
measure will be almost exactly the same as the overall
system average waiting time due to the fact that many of the
targets will arrive when firing is not in progress.
One last note. The reason for not directly considering
the length of the idle periods is that in our M/G/1 model it
is quite easy to prove that the idle period will follow an
exponential distribution with mean length equal to the
reciprocal of the target arrival rate.[Ref. 15, p. 208]
Unfortunately, we have no firm data on the arrival rate
itself but, by using the utilization factor we can avoid
this particular difficulty. This will be illustrated in the
next section where we shall examine the specific factors and
equations that will be used to evaluate the answers to the
questions we posed above.
C. THE SPECIFIC MOES
Before proceeding to enumerate the formulas which will
be used to measure our system's capabilities and their
implications for actual combat operations, it is important
to note that all of the equations that will be used come
from the steady-state solutions to the M/G/1 model. This
implies that we are looking at a fairly stable combat
situation and, as such, it may be necessary to modify our
approach if we wish to restrict our analysis to shorter
periods, say those of only 30 or 40 minutes duration or to
transient situations. Nevertheless, the steady-state
approach has a great deal of support for use in our
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particular model, especially since we are dealing with
artillery systems. Perhaps the most important argument in
favor of this approach is to note that OS doctrine does not
employ artillery in reserve. That is, while direct support
artillery units are often given the specific mission of
lending primary support to a maneuver unit which may,
itself, currently be held in a reserve capacity, the
artillery unit is so emplaced on the battlefield that it
will be able to fire in support of our units which are still
on the FEBA yet it remains prepared to shift its fires or
move in support of its primary associated maneuver unit.
This particular technique (probably adopted due to the fact
that, by usually being employed some distance behind the
lines, the artillery units are thereby less vulnerable and,
except in very unusual circumstances, do not perform as
arduously as the close combat infantry or armor units) thus
insures that, regardless of the specific tactical situation,
all of our artillery will be available among which we can
allocate fire missions. This fact of relatively continuous
and constant employment serves to drive our model into
functioning Eear its steady-state capacity.
Moreover, there is another important aspect of artillery
employment which also serves to insure a steady-state
situation and this is the actual manner of employment.
Thus, in addition to not being held in reserve, we find that
artillery units are also presented with a wide range of
missions which constantly require fires. For example, in an
offensive situation the DS units, as well as the others
present on the battlefield, are usually engaged in firing
preparatory fires prior to an attack in order to block off
enemy routes for reinforcements and to sometimes deceive the
the enemy regarding our actual objective, then shifting
fires onto the objective until our attack forces come within
range for their final assault when we then shift our fires
again to block enemy routes of retreat and/or counterattack.
83

On the other hand, in a defensive situation we engage in
fires on the enemy 1 s suspected or detected staging areas in
an attempt to break up his attack forces as they prepare to
move forward against us and, if the attack continues, the
artillery is called upon to deliver Final Protective Fires
for the main unit under attack as well as to block off any
penetration cf our lines. In delaying actions the artillery
is also rather consistently called upon to fire frequently
because its longer range capability means that the weapons
can remain in position and take the enemy under fire much
earlier in the engagement, before it becomes necessary to
continue the withdrawal. Finally, even in the lulls between
offensive and defensive operations, the artillery is called
upon to fire on targets which our various sensors detect or
whose presence is detected or suspected by the various
intelligence agencies operating in the combat environment,
not to mention the routine harrassing and interdiction
fires. Thus, since artillery units are seldom pulled cut of
the line, it would appear that a steady-state situation is
almost certainly present, at least for our initial
examination of the model and, having presented these
important reasons in support of this view, it is now time to
examine the formulas which will be used in our analysis.
1. The Server Utilization Factor
— B— —^b tJ ii - — — m —! ——
Pertaining directly to our first question of
interest is the server utilization factor, which is usually
represented by the Greek letter rho. However, due to the
limitations of my typewriter, I shall use the Arabic letter
"r" to denote the utilization factor throughout the
remainder of this paper. This term is also known as the





where A is the rate of arrival of targets into the firing
system and x is the mean time for a typical target to go
through all stages of the firing process, i.e. the time to
be completely served. Note that the utilization factor is
only defined for values of r such that: 0<r<1.
2. Besidual Target Life
The concept of remaining life or service time until
the present task is completed comes directly out of renewal
theory where this particular subject is dealt with in great
detail. Any reader interested in the full mathematical
development is referred to the excellent work by D. R. Cox
which is entitled Renewa l Theory. f Ref . 6] For our purposes
it will suffice merely to state the final results that
pertain tc our problem. Thus:
2 2
_
r. =|(x*<r> = f,i c,
where R is the residual life of the ongoing mission, x is
it
2
the mean service time (as defined previously) , and <T" is the
b
variance of the service time distribution (the b subscript
arising from our A/B/m notational system) . I have chosen to
rewrite the equation after factoring out the x term in order
to put the relationship directly into a form using the
sguare of the coefficient of variation of the service
2
distribution (C ) since we shall see this particular term in
b
several other MOEs.
3« Length of the Busy, Period
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While we want to get some indication of the average
length of time we will find our units firing, it is also
apparent that this number will vary due to the random
aspects of target arrival. Therefore, in addition to
evaluating the mean value, it may also be helpful to examine
the variability in this measure and thus both formulas are
presented here:
1 - r
where g is the mean length of the busy period and x and r
are as defined previously and:
2 2 2 2 2
g- = <r* + r(x) x (C + r)
g b = b
3 3
(1 - r) (1 - r)
where I have again factored the final form to reveal the
presence of the coefficient of variation.
4. NuB^S£ °-£ 2£££l§ts Fired on Durin g a Busy Period
Since this measure is directly related to the length
of the typical busy pexiod, it is perhaps no surprise to
find that
-1
h = (1 - r) = g /x
1 1
Note, however, that the variance of the number fired is not
so easily related to the variance of the busy period, even
after some simplification of terms:
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2 2 2 2 2
cr- = r(1 - r) + ^ (x ) r r C
h = b
3 3
(1 - r) (1 - r)
5- Average Number of Targets
While the last four measures have concentrated
almost exclusively on aspects of the busy period, overall
system statistics are still of importance, as was noted in
the discussion section above. Thus, here we present the
formulas for the average number of targets that we may
expect to find in both the overall system:
2 2
N = r + r (1 + C )
2(1 - r)
and in the queue:
N = N - r
6- Average Firing and Waiting Times
If we examine the average waiting time for all
targets, we find the following formulation:
2
xr (1 + c )
w = b
2(1 - r)
and that a simple relationship exists between this number
and the average firing time, to wit:
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T = x + H
This simple relationship is what we would expect, even if we
had no specific mathematical knowledge of our system, since
it merely says that even after waiting, it still takes an
average firing period to completely service the target.
?• waiting Time for Delayed Targets
As was pointed out earlier, this measure is of
assistance in determining the true delay suffered by those
targets which arrive at the firing element when it is
already engaged. Thus, we are not surprised to find that
the expected wait, given that the target is delayed (EWGD),
differs from the overall system waiting time due only to a




And with this last formula we are now ready to proceed with





A. SOME PBOELEMS DOE TO MULTIPLE MOES
In the last chapter we posed seven questions which were
considered important in obtaining some insights into
problems associated with the timeliness of fires on the
battlefield and the implications for standard artillery
activities such as maintenance, resupply, etc. In order to
answer those questions, a list of some eleven equations was
presented, by means of which we could gather numerical
information rather than merely debate in the dark about the
merits of various alternatives. Unfortunately, eleven
different MCEs become rather difficult to evaluate because
we thus have a multi-component vector of responses and are
confronted Mith the possible problem of trying to determine
which is a better tactical situation in the event that some
of our measures show widely differing trends. For example,
let us suppose that we are considering only a three
component system and that the higher numbers indicate the
more favorable responses. Thus we could have something like





It is quite clear that, in this circumstance, system 1 is
the better alternative because it has the more favorable
response in each individual component we chose to measure
and thus can be said to strictly dominate system 2. On the
other hand, had one of the MOEs been equal, say MOE 2, we
would still have opted for system 1 because of the dominance
in other factors. However, the following is also a




In this case our basic choice of system is not obvious since
we have a very complicated relationship in evidence.
Indeed, unless we assign some type of weighting scheme to
distinguish the importance of the individual MOEs, we are
left only tc our intuition to determine which alternative
may be the best one to pursue. Clearly, then, the number of
such complex possibilities increases tremendously as we
increase the number of items that we intend to measure and
that, without any specific knowledge beforehand as to the
relative importance of either basic trends or of the value
of one HOE compared with another, we cannot hope to arrive
at a satisfactory method of resolving this difficulty.
As demonstrated above, we can become hopelessly
overwhelmed by various relationships between our MOEs unless
some definite trends, such as strict dominance, make
themselves manifest. Therefore, it would most likely be
profitable for us to spend some time to determine whether we
can isolate any obvious mathematical relationships between
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our proposed MOEs, which would at least reduce the size of
the resulting response vector from eleven components down to
a more manageable level where important trade-offs might be
more visible and could be addressed directly. In this
regard, it is important to note that we may expect some
series of relationships to be present due to the high
recurrence of three common factors in each of our proposed
measures, i.e. the server utilization factor (r) , the square
of the coefficient of variation for the service distribution
2
(C ) , and the mean service time (x) . At least we would
t
appear to have some chance for simplification of our problem
as contrasted with a situation where our MOEs would not have
these various factors in common, so let us see if we can
reduce our problem through mathematical relationships prior
to looking for trends in output data which may or may not be
obvious to us.
B. SOME MATHEMATICAL SIMPLIFICATIONS
As we noted above, many of our equations are highly
2
dependent on three common factors: t, C , and x. Therefore,
b
we may expect that if we examine the simplified equations
which were presented in the last chapter, certain regular
relationships due to these common elements may emerge and,
indeed, such is the case. Four relationships are
immediately apparent, since we used them in actually forming
the equations in the last chapter. Thus:




T = X + W
-1
EWGD (1 - r)
g = xh
1 1
In addition, we also note that N itself is related to W and
T in the following manner:
N = rT/x = XT
which is Little's famous result. [Ref. 18]
Indeed, we note two important aspects related to our
simplification attempt. First, we have already managed to
reduce the vector of MOE results by almost one half - from
eleven components down to six. Secondly, we can readily
observe that a rather prominent intermediate factor in our
calculations is H, the mean waiting time for a typical
2
target, which is itself determined by r, C , and x.
b
Actually, our dependence on W is further emphasized when we
note the relationship between T and W as well as N and N .
q
Therefore, if we can determine the pattern of behavior
exhibited foi various values of W based on varying levels of
2
r, C , and x, we can relate this directly to four of the
b
five equations presented above, without the need to measure
these other results directly, due to the inherent
mathematical dependence we have just observed. Thus we have
the six MOEs which remain:
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1. The server utilization factor, r = % x
2. The expected waiting time for a typical target
2
1 - xr(1 + C ) rR
b L
2(1 - r) 1 - r
3. The mean number served during a busy period;
b = (1 - r)~
4. The variance of the number served during a typical busy
period:
2 2 2




5. The residual life of a target:
2
fi x(1 + C )
L 2 b
6. The variance of the length of the busy period
2 2 2




Having reduced our list of items of interest due to some
rather cbvicus mathematical relationships involving the




several of the basic system parameters (r, x # C ) , perhaps
b
we can continue this process to come up with a still smaller
set of MOEs with which to evaluate fire support performance.
In this regard, let us take a close look at the residual
target life. Here we observe that we still have a strong
dependence cr relationship with the average target waiting
time, to wit:
R = (1 - r)W
L
and thus we could eliminate the residual life from direct
examination because of this dependence characteristic.
Indeed, we could advance a similar argument in favor of
laying aside the average waiting time instead, but I believe
that most readers will have a better concept of waiting time
than the more abstract notion of the amount of time that
remains for completion of service, which is taken from
general renewal theory. Thus, confronted with the
opportunity to simplify our study by discarding one more MOE
from direct consideration, I have chosen to neglect the
least familiar term in order to keep the main thrust of the
development relatively clear for most readers.
Since we are still looking to reduce our MOE vector, the
next item that merits our consideration is the variance of
th€ length of the busy period. We have already ceased any
direct consideration of the mean length of the busy period
due to its close relationship to the value computed for the
average number of targets served during that time period.
However, since no obvious relationship appeared between our
variance term and our other MOEs, we have continued to
include this last item in our list. Nevertheless, is it
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really necessary to maintain this item if we are not
directly including the mean value to which it is intimately
related? I would propose that the answer to this question
should be in the negative, and that we also drop this term
frcm our main list of MOEs, at least until it becomes
necessary to do an in-depth analysis of the busy period
which cannot be handled by simple extension of our results
from other areas.
Finally, in our continuing guest for simplification, let
us examine the server utilization factor (r) . While this
certainly has an effectiveness aspect associated with it, in
that it is by means of this parameter that we can estimate
the percent of time that we are in a firing status, with all
of the concomitant implications which then pertain to our
fire support system, nevertheless, r is exclusively a
function of both the mean service time (x) and the arrival
rate of detected targets into our system (^)»
Unfortunately, while we can hope to measure or evaluate the
purely mechanical aspects of fire support, which also
provides us with estimates of the mean service time, as well
as more general human response data, even without checking
various distributional assumptions, we have no such
information regarding the target arrival rate, since it is
highly dependent on the particular scenario we are
observing, which includes such important factors as enemy
tactics and dispositions, etc. Indeed, this is one of the
reasons we assumed the long-run Poisson character of the
arrival process, because we have no concrete information.
Yet, the server utilization factor is extremely important
for evaluating all of our other formulas and we would thus
appear to have an insoluable dilemma on our hands. However,
we do have a reasonable way out of this impass.
For any given artillery weapon, or system, we most
certainly have what amounts to an average service time per
95

target when we consider the amount of time needed to destroy
all possible types of enemy targets averaged over the
various firing disciplines which our tactics call for.
Thus, we can consider that x is probably known, or can be
computed, for each tactical situation, or process, based on
whatever firing discipline we wish to employ. Then, with
the mean service time fixed for a given weapon or system, if
we vary the rate of target arrivals, this is equivalent to
varying r and vice versa. Thus, if we vary r in our study,
we can observe how our system responds as a result of
different tactical situations, which are thereby represented
by the differing arrival rates that would be apparent could
we actually test each situation. Also, by looking directly
at the effects of different utilization values, we can
determine whether any patterns are prevalent at a particular
level of activity, which may motivate further
experimentation or study in that particular area of combat
interactions. However, if we use this approach, then we
must remove the server utilization factor from our list of
MOEs, since it now becomes a surrogate variable for the
arrival rate, leaving us with the following three-component
vector: the average waiting time for a typical target, the
average number of targets served during a typical busy
period, and the variance of the number of targets served per
busy period. Since we can compute the values of any of our
other items of interest (in our original list of MOEs) from
these three measures, they alone are sufficient, for the
remainder of our analysis task, for providing information
about the operations of the fire support"" system.
Two brief observations are in order before proceeding
with our study. First, due to our lack of knowledge about
the exact arrival rate intensity, it is now clear why our
initial formulas were modified so as to eliminate any
dependence on and to put the final form completely in
terms of the server utilization factor and the square of the
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coefficient of variation for the service distribution.
Second, rather than require actual values for our various
service times, which will be different for each type of
tactical firing discipline as well as for each weapons
system we may wish to consider, let us factor our formula
for the avaerage waiting time thusly:
2
H = JL = r (1 + C )
F x b
2(1 - r)
where W will be the factor affecting the increase in
F
service time independent of any particular average service
procedure, being solely dependent on the actual system
utilization and the variability of the actual service
distribution. With this multiplication factor, we can then
adjust any actual or proposed service time to account for
the effects of congestion and randomness in both the arrival
and service distributions. Thus, we will also have a pure
number to use for comparisons when we examine the effects of
different distributional assumptions.
C. STUDY RESULTS
In the last section we managed to reduce the scope of
our analysis down to the examination of only three specific
measures: the average waiting time for a typical target,
factored to show the distributional effects; the average
number of targets served per busy period; and the variance
of the number of targets served in a busy period. Let us
now proceed to examine each of these measures in detail.
1 « Hi® Waitin g Factor
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As we noted in the previous chapter, the length of
time that a typical target must wait until it can be fired
upon has a direct bearing on our ability to provide adequate
fire support to friendly forces. This becomes increasingly
vital as the mobility of our target increases, since that
factor, in itself, raises the possibility that if the
waiting period is long enough, the target may become
unavailable for fire. Thus, it could be claimed that the
artillery system failed to respond adequately in that
tactical situation. In addition, the concept of the
"dedicated" battery places an even greater emphasis on the
timeliness of fires than was necessary prior to the adoption
of this particular tactical procedure.
Having reminded ourselves of the importance of this
specific measure, let us examine the implications different
service distributions have on our system's behavior.
Fortunately, as explained in the last section, we can factor
the specific average service time out of our equation and
thereby examine a "waiting factor" which is a pure number
not dependent on mean values alone. Thus, our average




where we need merely take the average service time of our
system and multiply it by the waiting factor due to our
specific distribution and server utilization factor. Since
the mean service time will be invariant with respect to the
distributions we use, i.e. the major differences between
distributions will be in other areas such as variance,
skewness, etc., we need only examine the waiting factor
itself in order to understand the net effects various
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distributions will have on our average waiting time. The
formula is therefore reproduced here for reference to the
analysis in this section:
2 2
R r(1 C ) r (1 + C )
F = b = b
2(1 - r) (1 - r)
If we examine the factored form on the far right of
the above equation for the waiting factor, we observe that,
with respect to r, the server utilization factor, we have a
-1
family of hyperbolic curves of the form y = ax(1 - x) ,
which has asymptotes at r = 1.0 and tf = -1.0, as in Fig 6.
F
However, due to the limitations we put on the server
utilization factor earlier, namely, since it represents the
percentage of time the battery is engaged in firing tasks, r
must lie between the values of zero and one, we are only
interested in the behavior of this family of curves in the
interval labeled "A". This satisfies our intuitive feelings
about the system, in that we can never have a negative
average waiting time, since that is a physical
impossibility. The best we could do is have arrivals which
occur just as the server becomes free and thus have no
waiting period at all. Indeed, our "a" parameter can never
be negative, since the only variable in its determination is
the square of the coefficient of variation of our service
2
distribution (C ) which is always positive. We should also
b
note that the behavior of the waiting factor in this
restricted region satisfies our intuition in another
important respect. That is, as the traffic intensity of our
system increases, longer factors for the waiting period are
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Figure 6 - THE HYPERBOLIC FAMILY
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produced, which is just as we would expect even without any
detailed knowledge of the applicable equations. As the
server becones increasingly busy, newer arrivals must wait
for their turn and this drives up the value of the average
waiting time in the system.
Having found the family of curves which describes
the behavior of our system with respect to server
utilization, we can now examine the effects due to the
different distributions played by our simulations. Since we
have previously noted that an M/M/1 system would represent a
long-run tendency of random behavior, and an M/D/1 system
would describe our deterministic models, let's look at how
they appear as we focus on the interval "A". The next three
figures illustrate the effects observed for these two
systems. The reason for three fifferent figures is in order
to show the differences more clearly due to the changes in
scaling on the vertical axis as the value of r increases.
Each graph illustrates the effect of the increase in server
utilization en the waitng factor.
It may be noted that, for the M/D/1 system, the
square of the coefficient of variation is equal to zero,
thereby yielding the lowest curve on the graphs. Thus, as
we expected, the deterministic system gives a lower bound on
random behavior since there is no random contribution from
the service element. On the other hand, the M/M/1 line,
with the square of the coefficient of variation equal to one
(since the variance of an exponential distribution of
inter-event times is the square of the mean) , is merely a
form of asymptote revealing the long-run tendencies. While
we expect that most processes we observe on the battlefield
will fall somewhere between these two limiting curves, there
are distributions (e.g. the Cauchy) which have such large
variances as to compel us not to ignore the possibilities of












Pigure 7 - WAITING FACTOR VS SERVER UTILIZATION FOR




Figure 8 - WAITING FACTOR VS SERVER UTILIZATION FOR




Figure 9 - WAITING FACTOR VS SERVER UTILIZATION FOR
CONSTANT LEVELS OF RANDOMNESS-III
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highly unlikely) . However, we would expect that, if our
stochastic simulations are accurately portraying randomness,
we should find that their choice of distibutions will result
in members cf our family of curves which approach the M/M/1
case. On the other hand, should the choice of distributions
in the stochastic models yield long-term results close to
the M/D/1 line, then we must ask some very important
questions regarding their usefulness over the deterministic
models in portraying combat interactions. With this in
mind, we can now examine the effects of the DYNTACS and CLGP
COEA assumptions by determining where, in our diagrams, the
final results lie.
In an earlier chapter we presented the DYNTACS and
CLGP assumptions which reflected that these models and
studies chose to use Normal distributions with standard
deviations equal to 20 percent of the mean response times
for each stage of artillery service. By imposing this
restriction on the variance of the Normal distribution, we
observe that the square of the coefficient of variation is
then equal to 0.04 under the model assumptions. However, it
turns out that this is only an upper bound for the system's
behavior (see Appendix B for details) . Thus, we can
evaluate the effects of the DYNTACS and CLGP assumptions by
2
observing where the line for C - 0.04 lies on our graph.
b
In so doing, we observe that there is almost no
distinguishable difference between the final results due to
the deterministic model and our use of the stochastic
simulations. However, before leaping to such a conclusion,
let us look at the values of the waiting factor from the
standpoint of varying the square of the coefficient of
variation and looking at the effects at different levels of
server utilization. As we do this, it will be noted that












the coefficient of variation and we can see the effects on
waiting somewhat more clearly since we are, in essence,
concentrating on the gap between our deterministic and
long-run curves when we isolate a particular value of r and
examine the effects due to server variability.
With the value of the waiting factor remaining on
2
the vertical axis, and our randomness parameter (C ) along
b
the horizontal, we can readily observe the effects of
different distributions. We immediately note that the
deterministic models yield the intercepts on the vertical
axis and I have chosen to cut the line segment at the M/M/1
point, thereby emphasizing our examination of the gap
between the two original bounds we set up. However, should
we discover later that our square of the coefficient of
variation is greater than one in practice, we can simply
extend the line segments as required. Nevertheless, by
isolating the gap, we find ourselves in the desireable
circumstance of measuring effects and trends which, like
basic probabilities, fall on a scale between zero and one
very naturally. This is a fortunate occurrence, especially
since the parameter which is varying along the interval is
our measure of the variability (or randomness) of the
service distribution. Thus, unless we obtain valid evidence
indicating that we should not confine ourselves to this
interval on an exclusive basis, we may view our results as
illustrating the waiting factor associated with the
percentage of randomness inherent in our system. Thus, zero
will indicate no variability at all (the deterministic case
by definition) and the value of one will signify full random
behavior, in this case our long-run tendency. Now, using
this point of view, we observe that the DYNTACS and CLGP
assumptions, having their upper bound of 0.04, or only 4
percent randomness, are thereby producing final simulation
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and study results that are statistically indistinguishable
from the deterministic models. Indeed, when we consider
that the great percentage of hypothesis tests use a 90 or 95
percent confidence requirement, were we to test our DYNTACS
results in comparison with the deterministic models of the
same process, we would be forced to conclude that no
significant differences exist.
Based on these results, we are now forced to
confront the question posed just a few paragraphs ago.
Namely, if we cannot tell the difference between the
outcomes of most stochastic models from those of the
deterministic ones, which should we use in modeling military
problems? The answer is, of course, quite clear. He should
choose the least costly technique in making our various
studies, since the results do not justify special
concentration on stochastic models, which are usually the
more expensive. However, this result thus far pertains to
only one of our final three MOEs and, even going back to our
original list of seven questions in the last chapter, we
note that only four elements are directly affected by this
development: the residual target life; the average number
of targets in the gueue and in the system; the expected
service and waiting times; and, finally, the expected wait
given that we are, in fact, delayed. While all of these are
important aspects of the fire support system, we have yet to
consider our other two MOEs, on which the rest of our system
depends. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to continue
with the arguments pro and con stochastic models until our
trends are either reinforced or annihilated by later
developments. In view of this fact, we will defer further
discusssion of this point until after the results of our
analysis of the other two factors has been completed and we
will then be in a position to determine whether this
indistinguishability of results is still important and




2- The Averag e Number Served per Busy Period
The second of our major MOEs chosen earlier is the
average number of targets served per typical busy period:
h = (1 - r)~
and we immediately note that the variability of neither our
arrival nor our service process affects this value. Again,
this is an intuitively satisfying result when we consider
that the average number of targets served during a busy
period should only be affected by the average number which
arrive and the average service time, all of which is
incorporated in the server utilization factor (r)
.
Consequently, regardless of the service distribution chosen,
this average will be constant for a given traffic intensity
and we can examine the variation due to different
utilization factors from the graph in Fig 11.
This result has an interesting implication for our
deferred comparison of the stochastic and deterministic
models, in that it provides us with some significant
insights into a paper deleivered at the 13th U.S. Army
Operations Research Symposium (AORS) by personnel from
Rodman labs.[Ref. 4] In that presentation, it was noted
that a comparison of the average of 10 DYNTACS runs with one
run of a deterministic model (in this instance the FAST
model) simulating the same general battlefield activity,
i.e. company and battalion level actions, produced results
in casualty figures and casualty ratios which were
statistically indistinguishable at standard confidence
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Figure 11 - AVERAGE NUMBER SERVED PER BUSY PERIOD
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forces were so closely matched between models (less than
0.36 standard deviations difference for Red and less than
0.58 standard deviations difference for Blue) as to
seriously raise the question, even then, as to whether the
least costly deterministic techniques are to be preferred.
Our observation about the mean number of targets served per
busy period thus assumes a significant role in explaining
these earlier study results. That is, when we observe that
casualties can only occur during busy periods, then, when we
average casualties over various runs of a stochastic model
we are, in essence, averaging the number served per busy
period. Since this number is the same regardless of the
service distributions used, we would be greatly surprised if
major differences occurred when we compared a deterministic
model and the mean values of several stochastic runs for the
same battle process. Indeed, since both models use the same
casualty producing weapons, the mean number of casualties
per ammunition type will be almost identical, and thus any
variation we observe in the final output must be solely due
to the variability inherent in our distributional choices.
The most important point here, however, is that our present
HOE, while seemingly unrelated to the variability in our
models, further reinforces the importance of our choice of
distributions, since only the variance of the distributions
is going to cause any different results and, thus far, we
have noted that the current choice of the Normal
distribution with small standard deviation with respect to
the mean, has produced results indistinguishable from
deterministic models. However, since the variability of our
models is still of primary concern, let us now examine the
final HOE, the variance of the number of targets served per
busy period.




We now come to the final component of our simplified
MOE vector: the variance of the number of targets served per
busy period. Op to this point, our previous considerations
of the first and second components has reinforced the
general results of our study, rather than revealing any
different tendencies inherent in actual operations.
Therefore, we would expect that we are likely to see even
further confirmation regarding the lack of variability in
our distributional choices since this current MOE is also
dependent on the relationship between the server utilization
factor and the square of the coefficient of variation as
reproduced below:
2 2 2




While we are now concerned with a family of cubic ^equations
in terms of r, we are still concnetrating on the interval
for 0<r<1. Looking at the details of this scheme as we vary
r for different fixed values of the square of the
coefficient of variation of the service distribution,
especially concentrating on our two limiting lines and the
DYNTACS case, we observe the same genral phenomenon at work
as noted in considering the waiting factor. Indeed, the
similarity of the results is so remarkable that, were we not
aware of the actual differences in the equations describing
these MOEs, we would almost be inclined to believe that we
are looking at the same graphs merely relocated in the
paper. Indeed, except for scaling changes, the behavior of
each of these MOEs (the first and third) are almost
identical. Thus, if we again concentrate on varying the
randomness parameter and holding r fixed, we observe that
the relationship is once again linear, but with a change in




Figure 12 - VARIANCE OF THE NUMBER SERVED VS UTILIZATION









Figure 13 - VARIANCE OF THE NUMBER SERVED VS UTILIZATION






Figure 14 - VARIANCE OF THE NUMBER SERVED VS UTILIZATION
FACTOR FOR CONSTANT LEVELS OF RANDOMNESS-I II
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noted trends are uncontradicted in this last MOE, we may
safely say that, since our earliest list of seven questions
simplified to this reduced form, all of our conclusions and
results are applicable to the entire system. Finally, with
all of our MOEs yielding consistent results from the
analysis, it is time to consider what our final conclusions
should be, and what implications they have for fire support
tactics and the analysis of combat models. Since this
concludes the analysis portion of the paper, I shall address
these new considerations in the following chapter.
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IX- CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. BASIC CONCLUSIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
In the last chapter we saw how our three basic MOEs,
upon which the answers to the seven basic questions in the
MOE chapter essentially depend, are influenced by the server
utilization factor and the variability inherent in our
choice of service distributions. Since the relationships
between the waitng factor and the variance of the number of
targets served per busy period, with respect to the
randomness parameter (the square of the coefficient of
variation of the service distribution) are linear in nature
on the interval between zero and one, it is possible to
reasonably address the problem from the standpoint of
looking at the percentage of variability played by our
models. Clearly, the deterministic models, by definition,
play zero percent randomness and, on this scale, the
long-run random model (M/M/1) represents 100 percent, or
maximum, variability.
Inasmuch as the major argument in favor of stochastic
simulations stresses the importance of their being able to
portray the random elements of combat with high fidelity, it
is rather shocking to observe that the specific assumptions
used in many stochastic models, such as DYNTACS, yield
results which are statistically indistinguishable from those
gained from deterministic models. Indeed, using the percent
randomness approach, we have seen that DYNTACS underplays
long-run randomness by a factor of 96 percent. While this
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tendency was hinted at in the Rodman labs paper previously
cited, our gueueung approach has given a formal proof that
what was observed there was not an anomaly. By the very
fact of choosing Normal distributions with relatively small
standard deviations, we are forcing our stochastic models
not to play what may be the true random nature of combat
interactions. Of course, the guestion which arises from this
conclusion is: Do we really believe that combat has
significant random features and, if so, how do we adjust our
models to reflect this reality? On the other hand, it may
be that the primary random influences on the combat process
do not appear in regards to weapon and human response times,
but affect other aspects of the battlefield process instead.
However, before addressing this possibility, let 1 s consider
what the effects of our current modeling technigues and
assumptions are, in the event that true combat is more
random than is currently being simulated.
In the process of simplifying our original list of MOEs
in the last chapter, we noted the high degree of dependence
for all of our measures on the average waiting time for a
typical target and that this could be traced to a waiting
factor independent of the mean service time. If we look
back at our graphs of the hyperbolic forms, it is readily
apparent that the greater the amount of randomness we
portray in our models, the greater will be this adjusting
waiting factor, since our deterministic case represents a
lower bound. The net effect, then, of not fully playing
whay may be true randomness of the combat process, is to
underestimate the amount of time that targets are delayed
and also the time they reguire for adeguate servcie. This
has serious implicatons regarding the level of casualties
inflicted by our forces and on the behavor of the model
itself. Thus, if targets are not delayed in service as they
should be, due to the actual randomness we want to portray,
this means that we are firing at them and producing
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casualties faster that we should. This has a great effect
on our overall system because, once a target is served, we
then begin firing at the next one sooner than is appropriate
and the effect "snow balls". The final result is that the
targets we have fired upon are being killed earlier in the
battle and faster than would normally occur and, moreover,
we are killing more targets than is justified, thereby
overestimating the effects of our weapons. This is a very
serious problem since, by overestimating casualties, we are
providing false effectiveness scores for most of our COEAs,
since the majority of them base weapon effectiveness on the
number of casualties produced. This situation is further
aggravated by the fact that weapons effects, themselves, are
definitely ncc-linear. That is, if we double the number of
artillery tubes firing, we do not necessarily double the
number of casualties produced. Thus, we run the risk of
choosing the wrong weapons systems for development if we are
erroneously estimating performance in the tactical
environment portrayed in our models. In addition, by the
non-linearity of the weapons effects, we have no guarantee
that the overestimation is the same for different type
weapons, Me merely know that it is present.
In addition to overestimating casualties, we are also
likely tc be overestimating the number of rounds fired.
This results from the fact that, in a given time period, we
are actually engaging more targets than we should, even
though the cnes we do engage are killed in the same manner.
That is, while it will still take the same number of rounds
to kill an individual target, regardless of the randomness
in response times (since the drawing of the random results
in the casualty subroutines is independent of the arrival
and service process) , the manner of casualty production is
not affected but the number of targets engaged is affected.
Conseguently , the more targets engaged, the more rounds that
are " fired, thus leading to an overestimation of ammunition
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expenditures. Since ammunition expenditures are usually
included in the costing equations of COEAs, this also
erroneously affects the cost of the weapons systems we are
comparing, in addition to the errors introduced on the
effectiveness side, which can then lead to the choice of a
weapon not appropriate for our needs due to our
misevaluation of the combat process.
While these implications are extremely important for
military analysts and the resulting doctrinal changes that
are incurred due to the adoption of different weapons
systems, the entire result hinges on whether or^ not the
combat process is close to the long-run random outcome
rather than being more deterministic, as we are currently
modeling it even in our stochastic simulations. Certainly
there appears to be a great deal of historical evidence
which indicates that the side with the greater force and/or
better weapons does not always win battles, thus reinforcing
our belief that there are significant random features that
affect the outcome of combat. The main question is: are
these features operating in the area of human and weapon
response times, or do they make their impact on combat in
some other manner which we have not yet modeled? If the
answer to this question is that the random effects we do
observe are the results of regular human and weapon
responses, then we are not currently modeling this facet
accurately in our choice of distributions, and more
experimentation and validation of our distributional choices
are required. On the other hand, even after some basic
validation, it may occur that our current distributional
choices are, in fact, the appropriate ones to make. In this
case, we are in a very desireable position as regards
choosing models to evaluate weapons effectiveness, for we
can then elect to use whichever technique is the least
costly in terms of our constraints on time, manpower,
computer needs, and the general budget. Since most
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stochastic models are usually more costly than many of the
deterministic ones, it would appear that for statistically
equal effectiveness, we would do much better to choose the
least cost method, even if we are overestimating the various
elements noted above, since we would still be making this
erroneous estimate but at least we can then use the savings
from the changes in our modeling methods in more profitable
ways. However, before we can safely choose this
alternative, we must be certain that we really belong near
the deterministic outcomes when looking at our stochastic
models. Onfortunately, this means that we must verify our
distributional choices, or else we could merely be
perpetuating our current errors at less cost. Now, this is
the point where most study papers and theses usually stop.
That is, the author calls for further investigation and
closes his paper. However, rather than leave the. reader
with the idea that such validation might be difficult and
expensive to perform, I intend to present, in the next
section, a way to verify the distributional choices of our
models which can be implemented at essentially no cost to
the U.S. government.
B. A NO-COST SOLUTION TO THE VALIDATION PROBLEM
Having demonstrated the importance of the distributional
assumptions used in our stochastic models, as well as some
of the important implications current choices have on
military analyses, j.t is crucial to determine just what the
true distributions describing human and weapon responses
actually are. Here, is where I believe that military
Operations Research personnel can probably make their best
contribution to the discipline. Since most combat models
are products of civilian "think tanks" or private
contractors, it is highly unlikely that significantly new
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contributions will occur in this area as a direct result of
the employment of on-duty military personnel. Likewise,
with the daily requirements for numerous studies and
analyses, the working climate, with its pressures to meet
deadlines, is not really conducive to the academic aspects
of expanding the frontiers of the discipline through
concentration on theory to the exclusion of practice on the
part of military analysts. Rather, it is on the operational
level that the trained military analyst may be likely to
provide the insights not available to the theoreticians or
the civilian modelers. A specific case in point is this
very study.
Having examined the fire support system as it currently
is implemented in daily operations, and some of the relevent
changes brought about in response to the 1973 Mideast war,
as well as current modeling procedures, it would appear
that, even with our simplified gueueing formulation, a great
deal of extra work is required to validate our present
distributional assumptions. However, when we consider the
full gamut of artillery operations on a regular basis, we
find that the data we need for this validation step is
already being gathered but, due to the lack of communication
between the researchers and the daily operators, this vital
information is discarded, rather than sent to the analysis
groups which need it. This unfortunate circumstance has
arisen precisely because the operational personnel,
untrained in analysis techniques and bewildered by the vast
complexity of military models, are not aware that the data
is needed. Likewise, the modelers, being far removed from
either the military itself or lower level operations, are
not aware that the data is already being collected.
Therefore, let's look again at the daily operational
activities of fire support units to see just what data we
can gather in regards to verifying our modeling assumptions.
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As we examine current operations in an effort to find
out where this needed data is collected, we observe that
every artillery unit which has a combat contingency mission
(rather than a training task in the event of war or
mobilization) is required to take an evaluation test at
least once a year to determine if the unit is "combat
ready." While this testing procedure is known by different
acronyms, such as ATT, OETT, etc., the same basic evaluation
procedures are followed. That is, the unit undergoing the
testing receives a mission-type order regarding a combat
situation and, after the start of the test period, all
operations are carried out under simulated combat
conditions. Now, in the case of the field artillery, rather
than a subjective evaluation by the umpires of successful or
unsuccessful performance, the unit is required to
demonstrate certain basic capabilities. Thus, the primary
determinant of success is the unit*s ability to get the
rounds on target within certain specified time limits after
receipt of the mission. In each case, the types of possible
missions, and their associated minimum performance
requirements, are prescribed by official documents, thus
further removing the testing procedure from the vagaries of
different umpire opinions as to what may constitute adequate
ccmbat performance.
At this point, the reader may be disposed to interject
that the procedure outlined above may be very good for
obtaining overall mission response times and the associated
mean, variance and other distributional information, but
that this does not give us any clue as to the specific
distributions to be used in modeling the sub-stages of our
fire support process. And, indeed, this is just the case if
we base our data gathering merely on the written guidelines
for conducting the test. Fortunately for Operations
Researchers, however, we must go beyond the officially
prescribed procedures to see how they are implemented during
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the actual conduct of the test. As it so turns out, due to
range requirements and various safety restrictions that we
impose on training exercises, it is not possible to conducct
this simulated combat exercise under true combat conditions.
Thus, in actual combat we might be able to say: the battery
received the mission at 1700 and reported completion at
1704, therefore total mission time is 4 minutes. However,
due to those safety restrictions and other requirements
noted above, this is not the case in testing. Instead, we
find that the firing process is often interrupted for such
reasons as computational checks to insure the weapons are
aimed properly (since the artillery is employed out of sight
of the target) and also to insure that the correct settings
are made on the weapons themselves, Doth for safety as well
as testing purposes, among other reasons. Since these
delays would not normally be a part of the combat
procedures, where the requirements for rapid fire support
would over-ride many of these extra safety checks imposed in
peacetime training, it is unfair to count these delays
against the unit's performance time. In addition, since
these delays are also involved with human responses
themselves, they have their own features of variability, so
that we cannot simply subtract a constant safety time from
each total mission time.
Therefore, in order to avoid this entire problem and
still measure the combat capability of the unit relatively
accurately and efficiently, the umpires are provided with
stop watches and specific personnel are assigned to monitor
and time the unit's operations in each of the three
sub-stages we identified in our queueing model: the Fire
Direction Center, the Firing Battery, and the Forward
Observer in his observation post. While many test teams
merely record the individual delay times and subtract these
from the total mission time, others follow the more direct
procedure of measuring the unit's response and, in some rare
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cases, the test teams measure both times as a check on the
computation cf total mission time. Nevertheless, regardless
of the procedure used, which is currently at the discretion
of the test team, the necessary data collectors are in
position with their stop watches, in essence gathering the
data we need for our models. It would thus be quite simple
to require that the umpires measure the uni^s response time
(or both the response times and safety times) and report the
individual events as they currently do. However, instead of
discarding this "component" data after calculating the
mission time for the test, we should require that the
responses be forwarded to the appropriate agency or modeling
group while still divided into the three classes of response
times we need fcr our models. It will then be possible,
after sufficient data has accumulated from the testing of
the various tactical units, to make an elementary
distributional analysis of the individual sub-stage
responses to determine not only the mean, but the variance
and appropriate distribution as well. With this
information, we can then proceed to our formulas obtained
from the M/G/1 queueing model to determine just where on our
randomness scale we are with respect to true response. In
the event that we are still close to the deterministic
solution, we can then make our choice of models based on the
least cost criterian. On the other hand, should we find
that we are not obtaining distributions consistent with
those assumed in the models, and that there is more
randomness in our processes than is currently being
portrayed in our models, we can then proceed to modify our
simulations to reflect the true state of nature if the
differences justify the amount of modification involved.
Thus, with our queueing approach, we have an easily
implemented, low cost technique, for deciding whether to
continue to develop stochastic models, or to make
distributional modifications, without the need to make the




C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STDDY
While we have reached some rather important conclusions
from our study Of the fire support process , there is still
plenty of room for further investigatio to gather the
essentially no-cost information about the service
distributions from actual process, and that arises naturally
from our gueueing formulation, would be n. The first area
of concern that might provide more insight into the combat
field operations. Having then obtained actual knowledge of
the overall service distribution from the convolution of the
sub-stages, we can then go back to our original G/G/1 model,
fix the service distribution to the known case, and
determine what the effects of different arrival processes
are. However, as noted earlier, the dependence of the
arrival distribution on the enemy's force mix and tactical
dispositions makes it highly unlikely that we would be able
to measure the true state of nature. On the other hand,
such an analysis might still provide us with enough general
guidelines about battlefield activity as to enable us to
identify significant operational trends if certain
situations occur in practice as well as theory.
The second area that provides a promise of fruitful
research is concerned with evaluating the effects of
assigning different priorities to targets, in order to
obtain better firing disciplines. This point was also
discussed earlier when we considered the importance of
mobile versus stationary targets, and their associated
maximum delay times for initiating fires. As a direct
result of the current study, we can see that our
understanding of delay times is causing us to account for a
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greater number of target (both mobile and staionary) as
casualties, than would be the case in actual combat. While
we would certainly hope that the data gathering plan
suggested in the last section would provide us with more
accurate measures of mobile casualties (due to the delays
that affect our ability to fire on them) we would also like
to test the effects of various decision rules currently
played in various models. For example, the AMMO BATES
methodology, which we examined in some detail, uses a
procedure such that if a mobile target cannot be taken under
fire within a specifid time frame, it is to be discarded and
ignored as having passed out of the system unless it is
reacguired at a later time. Since these time limits,
whether based on higher resolution stochastic models or pure
military experience, are somewhat suspect as regards the
validity of the waiting period, it would be desireable to
test different waiting cutoffs and priority assignment
procedures. Unfortunately, this would reguire the use of a
simulation, even using a gueueing methodological approach,
because the treatment of different priorities soon takes us
out of the realm of closed-form solutions. However, in this
regard, I would like to mention that a simulation of our
gueueing model, using the SIMSCRIPT Programming language,
has been built and debugged by the author. A copy of the
program can fce obtained on reguest from Professor James G.
Taylor of the Naval Postgraduate School. The simulation; in
addition to recording data regarding the factors affecting
the timeliness of fires, also has the capability of
recording various ammunition expenditures due to the firing
process and can easily be adapted to allow for specific
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QUEUEING TERMINOLOGY AND NOTATION
A. BASIC NOTATION
A convenient shorthand notational system has been
developed in queueing theory to facilitate the full
specification of queueing disciplines without the necessity
of continually writing out all of the significant
descriptors of a particular model. The full five-part
descriptor is of the form A/B/m/K/M, where the letters
denote the following parameters:
1. A indicates the interarrival distribution
2. B indicates the service time distribution for the
system
3. m indicates the number of servers in the system
4. K indicates the system's maximum storage capacity
5. M indicates the system's total population
The last two elements are often dropped when we do not
wish to consider such things as bulk arrivals, limiting
storage, or finite populations. Thus, the shortest code
often used is: A/B/m, and we assume that the descriptors
which are absent take on the value of infinity. For
example, the system M/M/1, perhaps the most common model in
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the literature and one of the simplest to analyze, is a
single server system with exponential interarrival times and
exponential service times which is capable of handling any
size queue or customer population. D/M/2/20 is a two-server
system with deterministic (constant) interarrival times,
exponentially distributed service times, and a storage
capacity of 20 customers or queue members, after which any
further arrivals are not accepted into the system.
B. DISTRIBUTIONAL SYMBOLS
The following is a partial list of common distributional
symbols used in this shorthand technique:
1. M - exponential distribution
r
2. E r-stage Erlang distribution
B
3. H Hyper-exponential distribution with R elements
4. D - Deterministic
5. G - General (i.e. not specified)
C. QOEUEING DISCIPLINES
The following is a partial list of common queueing
disciplines, i.e. ways in which the queue or service is
organized:
1. FIFO - First in first out, also called First come first
served
2. LIFO - Last in first out
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3. Priority - Type of service depends on the category or
priority of the customer
4. Pre-emptive Priority - Customers with higher priorities
take precedence over others in the queue (i.e. they can





AN UPPER BOUND FOR THE NORMAL CASE
During the analysis in Chapter VIII, the claim was made
that the previously quoted assumptions used in the early
DYNTACS formulation and, most recently, by the CLGP COEA,
resulted in an upper bound for the square of the coefficient
of variation, which is one of the driving parameters of our
queueing model. The reader may recall that the initial
assumptions held that each of the individual sub-stage
responses was to be modeled using a Normal distribution with
a standard deviation equal to 20 percent of the value of the
mean, thus: = 0.2 for each response distribution.
Since each stage of service in our model (FDC, etc.) uses a
Normal distribution with these assumptions, and since the
reaction time of each stage is independent of the length of
time it takes the other stages to function, we have the sum
of independent Normal random variables yielding our measure
of total service time per mission, which is also Normally
distributed with mean response equal to the sum of the
sub-stage means and variance equal to the sum of the
sub-stage variances, by the reproductive property of the
Normal distribution. However, while this. service
distribution is thus still "Normal", the square of the
coefficient of variation of this composite distribution is
no longer equal to 0.04. In order to illustrate this point,
let's examine a simple 2-stage process where a is the mean
response of the first stage, b is the mean response of the
second stage, and each stage has a standard deviation equal
to 20 percent of its mean. Then, for a and b individually.
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the square of the coefficient of variation is:
2 2 2 2
C (0.2a) = 0.04 and C (0.2b) = 0.04
a = b =
2 2
a b
However, when we take the total response due to passing
through both stages sequentially, we note the following,
where the reproductive property of the Normal distribution
yields a Normally distributed service response with:
E(Svc) = E (Stage 1) + E (Stage 2) = a + b
V(Svc) = V (Stage 1) + V (Stage 2)
2 2 2 2
= 0.04a + 0.04b = 0.04(a + b )
With this composite process, we now observe:
2 2 2
C V(Svc) 0.04 (a + b )
Svc = =
2 2 2
[E (Svc) ] a + b + 2ab
and, since we are dealing with response times which, by
definition, are positive, we note that the denominator is
greater than the sum of the squares of a and b, thereby
reducing the value of the square of the coefficient of
variation from 0.04 to a smaller value. Thus, the more
stages we add, the faster we reduce the value of the square
of the coefficient of variation from 0.04 towards zero,
since the more stages we have, the greater the number of
positive cross-product terms (ab, ac, be, etc.) that will
appear in the denominator. Thus, it is a simple matter of
using the techniques of mathematical induction to prove
that, regardless of the mean values and the number of
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sub-stages, this procedure of determining the value of the
standard deviation to be used by the individual sub-stage
processes will reduce the observed random effects to an even
greater degree than that of a single stage using the same
basic assumption as noted above. However, this upper bound
has a distinct use, since it provides us with a measure of
the best performance we could obtain if we applied these
same assumptions to the composite service process rather
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